Walden University

ScholarWorks
Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies

Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies
Collection

2021

Deterrence and Response Improvements for a Large-Scale
Cyberterrorism Attack
Harrison Cunningham
Walden University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations
Part of the Library and Information Science Commons, and the Public Policy Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies
Collection at ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact ScholarWorks@waldenu.edu.

Walden University
College of Social and Behavioral Sciences

This is to certify that the doctoral dissertation by
Harrison E. Cunningham
has been found to be complete and satisfactory in all respects,
and that any and all revisions required by
the review committee have been made.
Review Committee
Dr. Glenn Starks, Committee Chairperson,
Public Policy and Administration Faculty
Dr. Christopher Jones, Committee Member,
Public Policy and Administration Faculty
Dr. Joshua Ozymy, University Reviewer,
Public Policy and Administration Faculty

Chief Academic Officer and Provost
Sue Subocz, Ph.D.

Walden University
2020

Abstract
Deterrence and Response Improvements for a Large-Scale Cyberterrorism Attack
by
Harrison E. Cunningham

MS, Troy University, 2014
MA, The University of Oklahoma, 2011
BA, Boston University, 2006

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Public Policy and Administration

Walden University
February 2021

Abstract
A successful large-scale cyberterrorism attack has never been conducted against the
United States, yet cyberterrorism is a real and evolving threat. The United States assumes
a largely defensive posture toward the thousands of daily cyberattacks conducted against
the country, allowing cyberterrorists to probe and execute cyberattacks with broad
impunity. The United States would most likely respond to a successful large-scale
cyberterrorism attack within a framework of regulations concerning physical acts of
terrorism since no policy exists on how to respond to major cyberterrorism attacks. The
purpose of this qualitative study was to explore the perceptions of U.S. terrorism and
cybersecurity experts to understand how the country might better prevent, cope with, and
respond to a large-scale cyberterrorism attack. Punctuated equilibrium theory provided a
lens to understand the relationship between policy information flow and politically driven
change to guide this study. Data were generated through one-on-one semistructured
telephone interviews from nine cybersecurity and terrorism experts. These data were then
coded and analyzed to interpret patterns and generate themes. Results indicated that the
United States should not consider specific large-scale cyberterrorism attack response
options since terrorists likely do not yet possess the capabilities to carry out a
cyberattack. However, the country could do much more to prevent destructive
cyberattacks, to include eventual cyberterrorism attacks, through deterrence. The
implications for positive social change include improving the collective national cyber
defense, from small private companies to large government organizations. This study can
also raise U.S. policymaker cyberterrorism awareness through more extensive education
and improved synthesis of cyber related information to support accurate determinations.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
The United States acted quickly and aggressively following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. The first retaliatory strikes in Afghanistan by the United States
military occurred less than a month after 9/11 (Jenkins & Godges, 2011). Hundreds of
U.S. Special Forces soldiers, Central Intelligence Agency operatives, and thousands of
Northern Alliance tribesmen significantly weakened the Taliban regime and eliminated al
Qaeda’s safe haven by mid-December of that year (Hellmuth, 2018a; Jenkins & Godges,
2011). Nevertheless, counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan have been ongoing for
19 continuous years as of 2020, making the conflict the longest in U.S. history. The
United States public has yet to lose support for this conflict to levels seen during the
Vietnam War. However, an equally strong and sustained U.S. retaliatory offensive
following a major cyberterrorism attack against the country might not be as well
received, since already elusive terrorism guidelines would be further complicated with
the inclusion of cyberterrorism.
A growing reliance on the cyber domain in recent decades has created a new
opportunity for individuals and groups to infiltrate U.S. targets that would otherwise be
unattainable (Neely & Allen, 2018). Government organizations at all levels, financial
institutions, and defense agencies now maintain large networked digital databases full of
sensitive information (Holt & Kilger, 2012). Additionally, the proliferation of automated
systems integrated in U.S. critical infrastructure such as water, sewer, telephone, and
power systems leaves them all vulnerable to cyberattacks (Klein, 2015).
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Given the limited publicly available U.S. government guidance for major
cyberterrorism attacks, I explored the perceptions of U.S. terrorism and cybersecurity
experts to understand how the country might better prevent and respond to large-scale
cyberterrorism attacks. A response prepared during the sensitive and fervent days and
weeks following a successful large-scale cyberterrorism attack might not result in a plan
as well-crafted as one preemptively modeled. Additionally, post hoc cyberterrorism
regulations have the potential to be emotionally charged, which was the atmosphere that
the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT, hereafter Patriot) Act was created in
following 9/11.
Justifications for military conflict have been well documented throughout history.
Past wars and the rationale for each have largely been rooted in the theory of realism
which was first debated by the Ancient Greek historian Thucydides and has subsequently
seen numerous evolutions over the last 2,500 years (Morkevičius, 2015). However, a
realist viewpoint focuses on countries with respect to the international arena and therefore
does not offer much information regarding terrorism (Morkevičius, 2015). Additionally,
Islamic terrorism is sometimes considered merely a tactic or fad that will eventually fade
within the international world order dominated by sovereign states (hereafter states) and
can thus be downplayed by international relations scholars.
Though incomplete, justifications for the use of military force against terrorist
organizations, such as the United States versus the Taliban and al Qaeda, still generally
demand a humanitarian approach to warfare, or jus in bello. Yet, like realism, just war
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theory also has limited applications for counterterrorism operations (Taylor, 2017). This
theory prescribes that the United States should fight terrorist organizations in a moral
manner within the constraints of the country’s constitutional democracy (Walzer, 2007).
To further complicate matters, there is not one domestic or international agreed upon
definition of terrorism despite extensive information being written on the subject
(Dinniss, 2018; Gaibulloev et al., 2017; Marsili, 2019).
The United States classifies terrorists as unlawful enemy combatants as outlined
in the Military Commissions Act of 2006 and in the Act’s 2009 amendment (Goode,
2015). Unlawful enemy combatant is a classification that is internationally disputed since
the Third Geneva Convention only delineates between prisoners of war and
noncombatants (Goode, 2015). Because of this, the United States would have
considerable difficulty justifying military retaliation against the perpetrators of a
successful large-scale cyberterrorism attack considered unlawful enemy combatants
residing in a country not in open conflict with the United States (Goode, 2015).
Cyberterrorism is a frequently debated subject with some scholars even
suggesting that cyberterrorism should not be discussed separately from acts of physical
terrorism (Jarvis & Macdonald, 2015). However, the largely accepted definition of
cyberterrorism that I used for this study is: terrorism in cyberspace that features attacks
against computers and networks by subnational groups or individuals through violence or
fear to coerce or intimidate a state’s government or citizens to further political or social
objectives (Jenkins & Godges, 2011; Klein, 2015; Marsili, 2019; Warf & Fekete, 2016).
Even though no large-scale cyberterrorism attack has been successful against the United
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States, damaging attacks are still conceivable as the world becomes more dependent on
technology and terrorists continue to look for new ways to pursue cyber vulnerabilities to
achieve objectives (Albahar, 2019; Dinniss, 2018; Warf & Fekete, 2016). Consequently,
scholars and military commanders alike are well aware of the threats posed by
cyberterrorism and regularly discuss the probability of a successful cyberterrorism attack
disrupting or destroying critical aspects of the U.S. military, financial, and service sectors
(Neely & Allen, 2018; Wirtz, 2017).
This opening chapter includes an overview of the study. Chapter 1 is organized
starting with the background, problem statement, and purpose of the study. These areas
provide a foundation for the study by outlining conflict as it relates to cyberterrorism and
the potential issues that could arise from conflict. The chapter then continues into the
study’s core and includes the research question, a brief description of the conceptual
framework, and nature of the selected research paradigm and design. Next, definitions of
key terminologies are provided along with illustrating study scope factors including
limitations and delimitations. The chapter concludes with a statement of significance on
why the study should be conducted before summarizing and transitioning to Chapter 2.
Background of the Study
No country has threatened victory over the U.S. military through conflict in
decades. The United States has enjoyed complete military superiority in a unipolar world
created after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990. However, adversaries of the United
States are constantly looking for ways to disrupt and defeat elements of the country
through asymmetric warfare (Warf & Fekete, 2016).
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As technology continues to exponentially increase in importance and
sophistication, adversaries are finding ways to leverage these advancements for malicious
intent. The United States would likely have casus belli, or justification for war, if a
foreign government launched a cyberattack designed to cause catastrophic damage within
the United States. However, if a foreign government covertly conscripted individuals or
subnational organizations to carry out such an attack, the attack would be considered
cyberterrorism. The lists of potential targets for cyberterrorists in the United States are
vast (Albahar, 2019). The sheer number of targets essentially guarantees that terrorists
will be able to exploit many exposed weaknesses (Klein, 2015). Whether state-sponsored
or homegrown, cyberterrorism lets terrorists strike from virtually anywhere in the world
making the attacks more sudden and less predictable (Albahar, 2019).
Hacking of U.S. agencies and businesses has been conducted by states,
individuals, and groups driven by a wide range of motivations including profit, notoriety,
and ideology. China has acknowledged the existence of the People’s Liberation Army
Unit 61398, which was created specifically for cyber activities (Warf & Fekete, 2016). In
2015 the United States accused Unit 61398 of stealing data from 141 U.S. businesses
(Mazanec, 2016). Similarly, the military of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(North Korea) has an elite hacking team known as Lab 110 modeled after, and possibly
even trained by, Unit 61398 (Warf & Fekete, 2016). Lab 110 has successfully attacked
U.S. Treasury Department servers on multiple occasions from 2009 to 2013 (Warf &
Fekete, 2016). Lastly, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) has an extensive history
of conducting cyberattacks and has even been accused of starting Web War I against

6
Estonia in April 2007, which prompted the Western world to begin discussing the reality
of a cyberwar (Warf & Fekete, 2016). In addition to Estonia, the FSB has also been
blamed for conducting cyberattacks against Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 (Warf
& Fekete, 2016). However, to date no cyberattacks designed to cause extensive damage
within the United States have been successful (Klein, 2015; Kosseff, 2018).
The first and only successful cyberterrorism attack against the United States that
has been brought to trial was conducted in 2015 by a Kosovo citizen named Ardit Ferizi,
though the attack did not cause the deaths of any U.S. citizens as was its intent (Office of
Public Affairs, 2016). In June 2015 Ferizi hacked into the server of a private U.S.
company and extracted personally identifiable information on approximately 1,300
military and government employees (Office of Public Affairs, 2016). He then sent the
information to Junaid Hussain, a member of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS),
who published the information as a hit list on a website run by the Islamic State Hacking
Division (ISHD; Office of Public Affairs, 2016). Ferizi was subsequently extradited from
Malaysia to the United States where, in September 2016 he was sentenced to 20 years in
prison for both providing material support to ISIS and gaining access to a protected
computer without authorization (Office of Public Affairs, 2016). The Ferizi data dump
was notable because it resulted in the only person in the United States convicted of
cyberterrorism related charges as of 2020. However, Ferizi’s list was not the first or only
United States related sensitive data release published by ISIS affiliated hacking
organizations.
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The ISHD first published a list of 100 U.S. military personnel in early 2015 prior
to Ferizi’s own list being released in August of that year (Nance & Sampson, 2017). A
second list of 100 different U.S. military personnel was also released in September 2015
by ISHD following Ferizi’s release (Nance & Sampson, 2017). Most recently, in May
2016 ISHD publicized the names and addresses of 76 United States military drone
operators (Nance & Sampson, 2017).
Another ISIS affiliated hacking organization, the Cyber Caliphate Army,
famously hacked the U.S. Central Command’s YouTube and Twitter sites in January
2015 and released their own lists of U.S. military personnel on three separate occasions in
December 2015 and in January 2016 which totaled over 200 names (Nance & Sampson,
2017). Finally, in April 2016 yet another ISIS affiliated hacking group, the United Cyber
Caliphate, released the names of 3,600 New York citizens under the title, We Want Them
Dead followed by three large data dumps in April and June 2016 that totaled over 22,000
U.S. citizens listed as Revenge for Muslims (Nance & Sampson, 2017).
Yet, dangerous cyberterrorism events continue to be overlooked by U.S.
policymakers given the lack of resulting tangible physical harm (Warf & Fekete, 2016).
As cyberterrorism events are ignored, so are the potential responses and justifications to
those responses. However, cyberterrorism is a very real option for terrorists due to its
anonymity, debilitating potential, and psychological impact. It could be in the interest of
the United States to not only be prepared for a cyberterrorism attack but to also be ready
with the country’s response options following a successful attack. In this study, I
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addressed an existing gap in knowledge by considering better prevention and response
strategies for a large-scale cyberterrorism attack against the United States.
Problem Statement
The United States assumes a largely defensive posture toward the thousands of
daily cyberattacks conducted against the country. Cyberterrorists can therefore probe and
execute cyberattacks against a host of U.S. networks with broad impunity. The United
States would most likely respond to a successful large-scale cyberterrorism attack within
a framework of regulations concerning physical acts of terrorism since no policy exists
on how to respond to major cyberterrorism attacks against the country (Warf & Fekete,
2016). It is still legally unclear what attacks can even be considered cyberterrorism
(Dinniss, 2018; Marsili, 2019; Warf & Fekete, 2016). Given the debilitating nature of
cyberattacks and the potential to set off large-scale conflicts, the United States
government may need to publish cyberterrorism prevention and response guidelines to
better deter cyberterrorism attacks and dictate proportional response options. Policies
aggressively preventing and condoning such attacks as well as articulating approved
responses may result in countries being far less willing to sponsor destructive
cyberterrorism attacks against the United States.
It is not known what terrorism and cybersecurity experts believe is the best way to
prevent and respond to large-scale cyberterrorism attacks against the United States. A
need therefore exists to learn more about U.S. cyberterrorism guidelines from the
perception of experts. This research fills a gap in literature by presenting expert analysis
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on current U.S. government cyberterrorism policy including the validity of creating or
improving U.S. cyberterrorism deterrence and response guidelines.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore the perceptions of terrorism
and cybersecurity experts in the United States to better understand how the country might
prevent and respond to large-scale cyberterrorism attacks. A major successful
cyberterrorism attack has never been conducted against the United States so it remains
unseen what guidelines the country will use as the basis for a response. The current lack
of guidance could leave the United States in a vulnerable position following a successful
large-scale cyberterrorism attack given the unpredictability of potential responses.
Through expert interviews, the study addressed if additional measures may be needed to
better handle aspects of major cyberterrorism attacks, or if current policies are adequate
to respond to these attacks.
Research Question
Research Question: How do terrorism and cybersecurity experts perceive that the
United States might better prevent, cope with, and respond to large-scale cyberterrorism
attacks?
Conceptual Framework
I used punctuated equilibrium theory to analyze the prospect of creating specific
cyberterrorism response guidelines for the U.S. government. Punctuated equilibrium
theory was introduced by Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones in Agendas and Instability
in American Politics in 1993 (Baumgartner et al., 2018). This theory was designed to be
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broadly applied to a range of policymaking initiatives and focuses on policy change
driven by political organizations during protracted periods of stability coupled with bouts
of immediate change (Koski & Workman, 2018). Punctuated equilibrium theory has been
used to address budget change and health initiatives as well as policies covering
environmental, energy, tobacco, education, and political topics (Flink, 2017; Kuhlmann
& Van der Heijden, 2018).
The political process is both rapid and slow as policymakers implement existing
policies or create new ones to adapt to new information and changing needs
(Baumgartner et al., 2018; Flink, 2017). Punctuated equilibrium theory suggests that
governments often receive an overabundance of information that overloads individual
cognitive processing abilities (Koski & Workman, 2018; Kuhlmann & van der Heijden,
2018). Information is therefore not accurately synthesized, which results in some policy
issues being initially ignored with the potential for future overcorrections (Flink, 2017;
Koski & Workman, 2018). For example, overinformed and overtasked policymakers
have been displacing U.S. terrorism policy into a subsidiary role in favor of agendas that
have the potential for explosive change such as COVID-19 economy stabilization,
political reorganizing following the November 2020 presidential election, and new
Department of Defense guidance shifting military focus away from terrorism and toward
near-peer adversaries.
Punctuated equilibrium theory shows that all policy systems are susceptible to
policy change through error correction or error accumulation (Baumgartner et al., 2018;
Koski & Workman, 2018). Policymaking is incremental in the realm of error correction
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since policy is constantly adjusted in response to new information. Yet, organizational
responses are never quite proportional to the problem due to disproportionate
information processing, which can lead to punctuated changes (Flink, 2017; Koski &
Workman, 2018). In error accumulation, policy does not respond to negative information
due to barriers in the policymaking process. In this situation, pressure builds until a
drastic policy change is required (Flink, 2017; Koski & Workman, 2018). This study
could help U.S. policymakers avoid cyberterrorism error accumulation by identifying
barriers preventing the formation of improved U.S. cyberterrorism deterrence and
response options while also capitalizing on incremental change during stasis. A more
detailed description of punctuated equilibrium theory relating to this study is given in
Chapter 2.
Nature of the Study
Rudestam and Newton (2015) explained that the goal of research is to link the
theoretical level with the empirical level. This qualitative study addressed the perceptions
of U.S. terrorism and cybersecurity experts in order to support an open-ended hypothesis.
I used a systems approach for this qualitative study. Patton (2015) explained that a
systems perspective is important in dealing with real world interconnections and viewing
things as being imbedded in larger holes. He stated that a holistic mindset is central to a
systems approach since the properties of a system are lost when taken apart, and that
synthetic thinking should also be applied in which the whole is explained (Patton, 2015).
Patton (2015) finally believed that systems thinking is perfect for analysis where the area
as a whole is reviewed for strengths and weaknesses.

12
In this study, I addressed perceived appropriate deterrence and response options
for cyberterrorism attacks based on expert interviews. These options are decided within
the context of the government, which is the identified system in this study. Individual
components of the system are various government agencies such as the executive branch
and its components, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State. Each
organization has different focuses on terrorism and cybercrimes and they all, therefore,
have their own characterizations concerning cyberterrorism laws. There is not one
standard definition of terrorism within the United States (Dinniss, 2018; Gaibulloev &
Sandler, 2019; Hoffman, 2017; Marsili, 2019). Instead, each organization has created
their own definition to suit their specific points of focus. Based on a systems approach, I
addressed if current guidelines are enough to adequately deter and respond to a
cyberterrorism attack, or if more robust guidelines should be considered.
I used a one-on-one semistructured telephone interview as the instrument for this
study to allow leeway for script diversions for clarifications or to grasp deeper meanings
to answers. I identified the participants in this study through demonstrated expertise in
their respective terrorism and cybersecurity career fields as they relate to cyberterrorism.
I lastly assumed that data saturation would occur between eight to twelve individuals.
Definitions
Bounded Rationality: This idea denotes that policymakers are limited by cognitive
limitations (Baumgartner et al. 2018).
Critical Infrastrucure: Defined in the United States as systems relating to cyber
and physical defense, the economy, and public safety and health whose destruction or
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incapacitation would have debilitating impacts on their related sectors (Haber & Zarsky,
2017).
Cybersecurity: A state’s ability to guard cyberspace from crime, fraud, sabotage,
espionage, and other destructive interactions using tools, policies, and actions (Weiss &
Jankauskas, 2018).
Cyberspace: Computer and trancastional networks that store, send, and share
information online as well as the physical computer systems and infrastructure that
enable the flow of information and machine interaction (Klein, 2015; Weiss &
Jankauskas, 2018).
Cyberterrorism: Terrorism in cyberspace that features attacks against computers
and networks by subnational groups or individuals through violence or fear to coerce or
intimidate a state’s government or citizens to further political or social objectives
(Jenkins & Godges, 2011; Klein, 2015; Marsili, 2019; Warf & Fekete, 2016).
Cyberwarfare: Malicious actions in cyberspace that result in outcomes
comparable to major kinetic violence (Shad, 2018).
Disproportionate Information Processing: Processing that contributes to the rate
of policy change associated with punctuated changes described in punctuated equilibrium
theory (Flink, 2017).
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: A policy process theory for understanding
change in organizations. Punctuated equilibrium theory posits that political processes
operate primarily in stable environments defined by measured progress (Baumgartner et
al., 2018). Yet, these same enviroments can also experience significant political change
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(Baumgartner et al., 2018). The cause of change is driven by political agendas and
information flow and can be hindered by institutional friction or limited cognative
abilities (Baumgartner et al., 2018; Flink, 2017; Kuhlmann & Van der Heijden, 2018).
Systems Approach: An approach dealing with real world interconnections as being
imbedded in larger holes (Patton, 2015). A holistic mindset is therefore central to this
approach since the properties of a system are lost when taken apart (Patton, 2015). The
United States government was the system for this study.
Assumptions
Assumptions are aspects of the study that are believed but cannot be demonstrated
to be true (Creswell, 2013). I assumed that all participants were knowledgeable on
subjects related to their professions and that they all understood the context of the
research. I chose the participants due to their notable resumes and accomplishments in
their respective fields and I assumed that all participants provided accurate information.
Lastly, I assumed that my military background as a member of the intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance community had no effect on the data collected and its
public release.
I obtained all information used in this study from open source information. I had
access to classified databases but did not utilize any government networks to search for
cyber or terrorism specific information while enrolled in the doctoral program. I assumed,
therefore, that the military public affairs office would promptly allow the release of this
study.
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Scope and Delimitations
United States cyberterrorism prevention and response strategies were the sole
focus for this study, while excluding the applicability of creating specific laws related to
a cyberterrorism attack. Since U.S. laws apply mainly to U.S. citizens, cyberterrorism
laws would need to include a discussion on projecting laws into foreign countries as well
as creating and amending international treaties to respond to cyberterrorism threats.
Additionally, laws are more general in nature while a prevention and response narrative
focuses on specific actions based on specific events determined by the residing national
leadership. Because of this, an in-depth study of past laws concerning cybersecurity and
terrorism were omitted and the research instead focused on a qualitative study using
participant interviews to gain the perception of terrorism and cybersecurity experts.
This study could serve to promote dialogue between different federal government
and private organizations under the common impetus of cyberterrorism. I gathered all
information through interviews, allowing participants to focus on information they felt
was relevant and important. Cyberterrorism is a new and evolving field, driving current
information to become quickly outdated which is why the study relied heavily on expert
knowledge.
Limitations
Limitations are potential weaknesses in a study that are out of the researcher’s
control (Creswell, 2013). The main limitation of this study was the potential for
incomplete information due to a limited number of participants. Creswell (2013)
recommended three to ten contributors, and Morse (1994) suggested six participants to
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understand the core of the topic. While Creswell (2013) and Moore (1994) offered firm
numbers, Merriam (2009) believed sampling size depended on many factors including
research questions and data collection. Finally, both Merriam (2009) and Patton (2015)
identified resource limitations as a major factor for determining sampling size.
All study participants worked in various government, security, legislation, and
educational sectors so the perceptions of their knowledge could have been skewed by
their own lived experiences. Another major limitation of this study was not knowing what
controlled or classified guidance exists within the many U.S. government layers for
preventing and responding to cyberterrorism attacks. However, classified information
concerning cyberterrorism could not be used for public policy formation given the secret
nature of the information not made available to every policymaker or foreign
government.
I strived for unbiased research throughout this study, yet as a new researcher, it
was imperative for me to identify and attempt to mitigate all potential biases before
beginning the research. Above all, I attempted to avoid conformation bias by not forming
any premature hypothesis or beliefs concerning cyberterrorism. I also objectively
collected and analyzed all information before drawing any conclusions.
Significance of the Study
In this study, I investigated if cyberterrorism policies could be improved to ensure
that a future U.S. federal government response to a large-scale cyberterrorism attack is
effective, is in line with the values of the United States, and is also palatable with the
international community. A multitude of domestic policies are created to directly address
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acts of physical terrorism. These policies could also be used to prevent and persecute acts
of cyberterrorism. However, it might not be ideal to utilize physical terrorism policies to
guide U.S. cyberterrorism agendas given the inconclusive nature of cyberattacks as well
as the many disconnects between U.S. and international guidelines.
The United States government has not given serious thought to a large-scale
cyberterrorism attack partially because terrorists are still believed to lack the technology
to conduct these destructive attacks (Fidler, 2016; Nance & Sampson, 2017). Further, no
scholarly research has been drafted to advocate for cyberterrorism specific policies
designed to prevent or respond to debilitating cyberterrorism attacks within the United
States. The only U.S. regulation that directly addresses cyberterrorism is section 814
Deterrence and Prevention of Cyberterrorism of the non-permanent Patriot Act (Podgor,
2002). However, section 814 focuses on penalties for individuals gaining unauthorized
access to computers which would not benefit the United States in the aftermath of a
successful large-scale cyberterrorism attack.
Given this lack of guidance, the United States government has the potential to
make mistakes while attempting to retaliate from a successful significant cyberterrorism
attack in a timely manner against an elusive enemy. An aggressive unilateral response by
the United States to a cyberterrorism attack could subsequently generate negative
repercussions against the country domestically, as well as from the greater international
community. Yet, the negative effects of a retaliation could be minimized if the United
States preemptively implemented an all-inclusive and universally palatable
cyberterrorism strategy.
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Summary
Terrorism is an evolving definition which is often tailored to align with the
purposes of federal government entities each offering their own specific descriptions.
There are also no sanctioned categories for terrorists at the international level as is
evidenced by the United States’ controversial assertion of unlawful enemy combatants.
The inclusion of cyber in the pursuit to define and categorize terrorists only serves to
make the task of accurately classifying terrorists more complicated.
A vast majority of cyberattacks conducted against the United States have been
thwarted, though cyberattacks attacks have and will continue to be successful against all
levels of the U.S. government and industry. The country’s ever-increasing reliance on
technology provides more daily opportunities for cyberattacks to occur in places within
the United States that were once deemed untouchable. Terrorists are currently assessed to
not possess the technology to conduct a damaging cyberattack against the United States,
but the threat is getting more tangible with each passing day. It could also be in the realm
of possibilities for terrorists to surprise the world with a large-scale cyberterrorism attack
within the United States just as they did conventionally on September 11, 2001.
The United States has strict rules in place that guide conventional responses to
hostilities. Following a large-scale cyberterrorism attack against the country, the U.S.
government could adapt these guidelines to suite a new type of warfare, or they could
ignore them all together. Either way, decisions would be made with incomplete
information by U.S. leaders in the tense aftermath of a successful large-scale
cyberterrorism attack. Because of this, it might benefit the U.S. government to draft a
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succinct response plan to a large-scale cyberterrorism attack in order to be prepared to
respond smarty to any such attack and to also highlight a deterrence plan in order to
prevent cyberterrorism attacks from occurring at all.
In Chapter 2, I provide an exhaustive review of the current literature related to
cyberwarfare, terrorism, and cyberterrorism and identify the databases used to obtain this
literature. I also expand on punctuated equilibrium theory and relate it to previous
cyberterrorism associated work. I lastly review and synthesize available literature as it
relates to the research question in order to justify the holistic thinking based on a systems
approach.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Research Problem and Purpose
A successful large-scale cyberterrorism attack against the United States could
have the potential to set off a widespread conventional military conflict. Because of this,
the U.S. government may need to create a cyberterrorism specific plan to outline
deterrence initiatives and draft proportional response options. Cyberterrorism prevention
and response plans would serve to quickly and effectively bolster defenses or facilitate
responses that are in line with all previously considered domestic and international
guidelines and principles.
The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore the perceptions of terrorism
and cybersecurity experts in the United States to better understand how the country might
prevent and respond to large-scale cyberterrorism attacks. The U.S. government will act
in an unpredictable manner following a successful large-scale cyberterrorism attack
against the country because the attack would place the government in an unfamiliar
position with limited guidance. Yet, no public U.S. research or legislation exists for
prevention and response strategies related to a large-scale cyberterrorism attack. In this
chapter, I give a detailed review of all publicly available information on cyberterrorism
that I acquired using several approaches to ensure that all information was extracted.
Literature Search Strategy
A majority of the information referenced for this study consists of peer-reviewed
journal articles relevant to cyberterrorism with an emphasis on research from 2016 to
2020. I primarily conducted research through online databases consisting of Academic
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Search Complete, Political Science Complete, Google Scholar, SAGE Premier, and
ProQuest Central. I used Ulrich Periodicals to ensure that journals referenced in this
study were peer-reviewed. The database search terms included cyberattack, cybercrime,
cyberterrorism, cyberwar, hacking, information warfare, international, laws, NATO,
national security, punctuated equilibrium theory, responses, state-sponsored, terrorism,
United Nations, and United States. One hundred and twelve peer-reviewed studies from
2016 to 2020 supported the findings of the literature review and this study.
Theoretical Foundation
Overview and Key Framework Proposition
Democratic political processes are outwardly associated with long periods of
relative stability. These governments follow rules and regulations for electing officials,
formulating laws, and governing citizens. Yet, government operations during disasters,
such as 9/11, shift to crisis management which often becomes the catalyst for rapid
political change. Punctuated equilibrium theory shows that stability and change are
important aspects of the political process and includes both into its framework
(Baumgartner et al., 2018; Kuhlmann & Van der Heijden, 2018).
In this study, I used punctuated equilibrium theory to review the validity of
improving U.S. cyberterrorism deterrence and response options. Cyberterrorism guidance
is created by policymakers in either relative stability before a cyberterrorism attack or
within an excited environment following a successful cyberterrorism attack. Terrorism
and cybersecurity experts cannot make changes to U.S. policy without policymaker
concurrence. These experts, therefore, must observe and navigate U.S. government
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institutional friction described by punctuated equilibrium theory in order to offer
improvements for cyberterrorism deterrence and response guidelines. They must
additionally work with policymakers for any cyberterrorism response plan drafted in the
chaotic environment following a large-scale cyberterrorism attack. I used punctuated
equilibrium theory to conceptualize expert cyberterrorism deterrence and response plan
improvements in these two very different environments.
Punctuated equilibrium theory draws from political science approaches
acknowledging that political processes mostly operate in stable environments defined by
measured progress (Baumgartner et al., 2018; Koski & Workman, 2018; Noone, 2019).
Yet, these same enviroments can also experience decisive change to resolve large
political problems (Baumgartner et al., 2018; Noone, 2019). Punctuated equilibrium
theory states that decisions are made through bounded rationality or within the cognative
abilities and timeframes of policymakers and organizations (Kuhlmann & Van der
Heijden, 2018). The theory emphasizes issue definition and agenda setting with respect to
the policy process to help quantify the variation in change (Baumgartner et al., 2018;
Koski & Workman, 2018).
Issues are addressed by priority in public agendas to either reinforce or question
standing polices (Baumgartner et al., 2018; Koski & Workman, 2018). Reinforced
policies can only be margionaly reformed, yet questioned policies can create an
atmosphere for large change (Baumgartner et al., 2018). However, even when change is
evident, institutional friction can present a barrier by making the policy change process
difficult (Flink, 2017; Koski & Workman, 2018). This friction causes pressure to build
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which leads to a punctuation overtime (Flink, 2017; Koski & Workman, 2018).
Punctuated equilibrium theory thus also offers reasoning for the sudden shifts in policy
change.
Punctuated equilibrium theory was created to be widely applied to many policy
venues and is recognized in the United States and throughout the world (Koski &
Workman, 2018). Since 1993 the theory has appeared in 90 mostly U.S.-based journals
covering public administration, public policy, U.S. politics, and comparative politics
(Baumgartner et al., 2018; Kuhlmann & Van der Heijden, 2018). Kuhlmann and Van der
Heijden (2018) identified 86 high quality articles not written by the punctuated
equilibrium theory’s creators covering topics ranging from budget change, health,
environmental and energy policy, tobacco policy, and education policy (Flink, 2017;
Kuhlmann & Van der Heijden, 2018).
Literature Review Related to Key Concepts
Communication and the flow of information play important roles in virtually all
aspects of life and are integral for collective security and stability (Osawa, 2017). Nearly
half of the world’s population is connected to the internet with access to information
available through infrastructure consisting of networks, software, and facilities (Nye,
2017; Shad, 2018). However, increasing worldwide dependence on cyberspace has
exposed mounting malicious cyber activities which has raised security concerns (Nye,
2017; Osawa, 2017).
Cyberattacks can be classified as either exploitation attacks on computer systems
or destructive physical attacks using computer systems (Shad, 2018). The main culprits of
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cyberattacks are states, terrorist groups, terrorist sympathizers, anti-government hackers,
and thrill-seekers (White, 2016). Taken wholly, the internet provides a massive target for
criminals operating in relative safety to cause damage and disruption far exceeding any
conventional attack (Albahar, 2019). In fact, a successful large-scale cyberattack could
cost the United States upwards of $50 billion USD which is comparable to a severe
natural disaster (Osawa, 2017). Cyberspace is still a largely unregulated domain and
cybercriminals and cyberterrorists will continue to conduct increasingly brazen attacks
and exploit cyberspace to their advantages until comprehensive policies are drafted to
address these threats.
Rationale and Relevance of Framework
Punctuated equilibrium theory is relevant for justifying cyberterrorism deterrence
and response plans during periods of relative stability before a successful large-scale
cyberterrorism attack as well as in an environment primed for rapid political change
following an attack. This theory is also relevant when comparing its concepts of
constrained agendas and the cognitive ability limits of policymakers to the long
attribution process and technical nature of cyberattacks. Data extracted through expert
interviews clarified any past cyberterrorism policy attempts. Punctuated equilibrium
theory also highlights the many barriers for successful political change as well as the
reasoning for the rapid implementation of the Patriot Act following 9/11, which
significantly altered U.S. counterterrorism guidelines. Finally, punctuated equilibrium
theory was used as a lens to understand the relationship between policy information flow
and political change to guide this study.
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Punctuated equilibrium theory has been the chosen methodology for 59 peerreviewed journal articles with 66% of these articles published from 2010 to mid-2020.
Yet, punctuated equilibrium theory related to terrorism, cyber, and security all yielded
zero search returns in multiple academic peer-reviewed databases. However, punctuated
equilibrium theory was the chosen methodology for eight publicly available terrorism
dissertations, 84 policy dissertations, and eight security dissertations with 69% published
from 2010 to mid-2020. Therefore, punctuated equilibrium theory is predominately
coupled with policy focused peer-reviewed journal articles and dissertations, as was this
study, and has been growing in popularity since its 1993 advent.
Cyberwarfare
There is currently no consensus on what defines a cyberwar or when a cyberattack
could be considered an armed attack. Further debate arises on if a cyberattack constitutes
a casus belli or if just war theory would apply to cyberconflict (Sleat, 2017). States must
currently defer to domestic and international guidelines relating to cybercrime and armed
conflict for guidance since no binding international frameworks exist to address
cyberwarfare. The difficulty to apply laws that were created before the invention of
computers while considering the complex nature of cyberspace will limit the abilities of
some states to act while others will use the inevitable ambiguities for their own
advantages (Fenton, 2019).
International Reception
Multilateral institutions are largely incapable of addressing the evolving issues of
cyberspace related crime and conflict. The Council of Europe’s Convention on
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Cybercrime, also known as the Budapest Convention, is currently the only binding
international treaty dedicated to cybercrimes (Van Dine, 2020). The intent of the
Budapest Convention is to provide a common legal basis to minimize barriers for
international prosecution (Van Dine, 2020). Since 2004 64 states including the United
States have ratified the Budapest Convention. Signature parties have integrated aspects of
this Convention into their own domestic laws, yet the Convention’s main purpose is to
offer frameworks for states to use as guidelines to construct their own cyber related
criminal legislation (Van Dine, 2020). The two international groups most active in
defining cyberwarfare standards are the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO; Mazanec, 2016).
UN
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use of force or the threat of force
against another state (UN, 1945). This Article essentially bans UN members from using
force on all but the two following conditions articulated by the Charter. Article 42 states
that force can be used when the Security Council authorizes it in order to restore peace
(UN, 1945). Additionally, Article 51 permits using force for the purposes of individual or
collective self-defense following an armed attack (UN, 1945). An armed attack is viewed
as a higher level of transgression than use of force highlighted in Article 2(4) (Dev,
2015). It is generally accepted that a state can exercise its right to self-defense in Article
51 following a cyberattack if that attack meets armed attack thresholds (Dev, 2015). Yet,
legal ambiguities exist on whether Article 2(4) and Article 51 apply to non-state actors
conducting cyberterrorism attacks (Efrony & Shany, 2018). There is also uncertainty on
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when a cyberattack would be considered use of force prohibited by Article 2(4) (Efrony
& Shany, 2018). However, the UN occasionally clarifies cyber related Charter
ambiguities with policy releases.
In 2013 the UN adopted cybercrime and cybersecurity principles to standardize
policy and facilitate UN assistance for cyberspace related issues (Dorn, 2018). In 2014
the UN declared that self-defense could be used in response to a cyberattack under
Article 51 of the UN Charter (Hodgkinson, 2018). Yet, discussions in 2017 concerning
responsible state behavior in cyberspace failed to produce a report or even reach an
agreement (Boeke & Broeders, 2018).
The UN is currently composed of 193 Member States, omitting only the Holy See
(metonymically known as Vatican City) and Palestine. Not surprisingly then, worldwide
consensus on vague or controversial topics can be difficult. Additionally, the 15 member
UN Security Council must unanimously agree to adopt resolutions. The five permanent
members of the Security Council are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. The varying ideologies of these governments make unanimous agreements
on cyberspace measures problematic. However, NATO is an international organization
better suited to respond to cyberspace related issues given its collective defense
conception.
NATO
NATO is a military alliance consisting of 30 North American and European
states. The Alliance opened the Cyber Defence Center of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia
in 2008 one year after a 3-week long suspected Russian cyberattack against the country
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(László, 2018; Marsili, 2019). NATO subsequently made cyber defense and preparing for
cyberspace conflict a priority at the Alliance’s 2010 Lisbon Summit (László, 2018).
NATO implemented additional cyber related policies, plans, and response cells at the
2012 Chicago Summit (László, 2018). Following this Summit, NATO’s Cyber Defence
Center of Excellence released the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to
Cyber Warfare in 2013 which is now used as a basis for all cyber actions (László, 2018).
The Tallinn Manual contains cyber conflict and security topics including
sovereignty, jus ad bellum, and international humanitarian law as interpreted by
international experts (Barrett, 2017; László, 2018; Marsili, 2019). The manual addresses
the difficulties of legally framing cyberattacks as well as defining attacks as criminal or
political and attributing them to state or non-state actors (Marsili, 2019). An updated and
significantly expanded “Tallinn Manual 2.0” was released in 2017 which also explores
how international law relates to peacetime cyber operations and to cyberattacks that
would not be considered armed attacks (Efrony & Shany, 2018; Hodgkinson, 2018;
Marsili, 2019).
At the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, the Alliance agreed that international law
extended to cyberspace and acknowledged that cyberattacks could be as dangerous as
conventional attacks thereby making cyber defense an integral part of NATO’s collective
security (Hodgkinson, 2018; Marsili, 2019; Osawa, 2017). As a result, cyberattacks
against a member state meeting armed attack criteria would invoke Article 5 which
requires NATO to collectively aid any attacked member (Hodgkinson, 2018; Marsili,
2019). Finally, NATO elevated cyberspace to a fourth operational dimension of warfare
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along with air, sea, and land at the Alliance’s 2016 Warsaw Summit (László, 2018;
Marsili, 2019). The United States, NATO’s primary partner, has created cyber policy
largely in parallel with NATO to both enhance international cooperation and to
unilaterally address cyberthreats.
United States’ Reception
U.S. technological innovation was accelerated by the rapid electronic
developments following World War II (Bracken, 2017). New inventions improved many
individual and collective aspects of the country. Yet, the proliferation of technical
knowledge was also inevitably used for nefarious purposes.
The United States first addressed concerns regarding U.S. networked computer
systems in President Ronald Regan’s 1984 National Security Decision Directive 145
which acknowledged that networked systems were vulnerable to exploitation and called
for a plan to secure them (Boys, 2018). By the mid-1980s it became clear that foreign
governments and terrorist organizations were in fact infiltrating networked computer
systems throughout the United States (Boys, 2018). In the early-1990s the U.S. National
Research Council and the National Academy of Sciences reiterated U.S. computer
vulnerabilities and identified the possibility of a deliberate cyberattack against the
country (Boys, 2018). President George H.W. Bush addressed these concerns in National
Security Directive 42 which outlined a coordinated national security defense structure to
guard against foreign threats (Boys, 2018; Tabansky, 2018).
By the mid-1990s government officials began to recognize the significant
cyberspace risks to U.S. national security and President Bill Clinton signed six
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cybersecurity related executive orders from 1993 to 1999 (Boys, 2018). These executive
orders created various organizations to address a range of developing issues including
information networks, foreign access to U.S. technology, critical infrastructure
protection, encryption export controls, and internet regulation (Boys, 2018). Yet,
President Clinton’s most comprehensive cybersecurity document was Presidential
Decision Directive 63, released in 1998, that created directorates, offices, and groups to
ensure economic and critical infrastructure cyberspace protection (Boys, 2018). This
Directive also highlighted cyberwarfare as a threat to U.S. military superiority (Boys,
2018; Tabansky, 2018).
Cyberspace rapidly expanded throughout the 1990s as the popularity of personal
computers and the internet increased worldwide. President George W. Bush released the
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace in 2003 which called for private and public
cooperation to create an emergency response system for cyberattacks (Wilner, 2020). He
also released the still classified National Security Presidential Directive 38 relating to
cyberspace security that same year (Wilner, 2020). President Bush expanded his 2003
Cyberspace Strategy in the 2008 Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative
established by National Security Presidential Directive 54 (Wilner, 2020). This Initiative
provisioned cybersecurity roles to government agencies such as U.S. government
network protection to the Department of Homeland Security, attack deterrence to the
Department of Defense, information coordination to the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and counterintelligence development to the Director of National Intelligence (Wilner,
2020). Present Barack Obama made cybersecurity a priority and expanded and completed

31
President Bush’s Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative in 2009 with the
creation of the U.S. Cyber Command under the Department of Defense to unify and
strengthen cyberspace operations (Wilner, 2020).
President Obama’s 2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace stated that the
United States will use all necessary means for cyberattack defense but will limit military
force as a last resort (Mazanec, 2016; Wilner, 2020). President Obama combined this
Strategy with his 2012 top-secret Presidential Policy Directive 20 (made public by
Edward Snowden in 2013) outlining a cybersecurity framework to establish principles
and processes for offensive U.S. cyber capabilities (Hodgkinson, 2018; Marsili, 2019).
Finally, President Obama reiterated strengthening critical infrastructure cybersecurity
frameworks with Presidential Policy Directive 21 in 2013 as well as in his 2015 National
Security Strategy (Kosseff, 2018; Tabansky, 2018). Cyberspace security was perceived to
be a very real threat in the United States following Russian interference in the 2016 U.S.
presidential election, and President Donald Trump continued to strengthen U.S.
cybersecurity frameworks created by his predecessors after taking office.
President Trump issued Executive Order 13800 on Strengthening the
Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure four months after his 2017
inauguration to grow and sustain a cybersecurity workforce to achieve cyberspace
objectives (Marsili, 2019; Osawa, 2017). President Trump then released the National
Cyber Strategy of the United States of America a year later in 2018 which updated
President Bush’s 2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (Wilner, 2020).
Following Executive Order 13800 and the 2018 Cyber Strategy, the Department of State
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released presidential guidance for prioritizing cyberthreats in domestic and foreign policy
and strengthening international cyberspace cooperation (Marsili, 2019; Wilner, 2020).
Finally, in 2018 President Trump rescinded Presidential Policy Directive 20 to loosen
restrictions that President Obama had placed on cyber operations while also elevating
Cyber Command to one of the Department of Defense’s eleven Unified Combatant
Commands (Marsili, 2019; Wilner, 2020). Presidential directives, executive orders, and
strategies assign cyberspace related tasks to many U.S. government departments. Yet, the
three departments leading U.S. cyberspace policy and execution are the Department of
Defense, the Department of State, and the Department of Homeland Security.
The Department of Defense is predictably responsible for the defense of
cyberspace and the deterrence of cyberattacks. Like NATO, the Department of Defense
views cyberspace a separate operational domain (Marsili, 2019; Tabansky, 2018).
However, the Department of Defense is subservient to the Department of Homeland
Security concerning domestic cyber operations and can only act after the Department of
Homeland Security requests assistance following an emergency in accordance with the
U.S. Defense Support of Civil Authorities (Tabansky, 2018).
The Department of Homeland Security is therefore responsible for guarding
domestic U.S. computer networks from threats. Specifically, the Department of
Homeland Security protects civilian government information systems with assistance
from agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation under the U.S. Department of
Justice and through the Central Intelligence Agency as part of the greater 16 agency U.S.
Intelligence Community (Marsili, 2019; White, 2016). The Department of Homeland
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Security does share cyber related information with the private sector, yet the Department
cannot regulate private cyber processes (Kosseff, 2018).
While the Department of Homeland Security is concerned exclusively with
domestic cyber matters, the Department of State concentrates on international
engagement. In line with its diplomatic purpose, the Department of State promotes an
open and secure cyberspace to support cyberspace goals and shape cyber norms
worldwide. The Department of State did create the Office of the Coordinator for Cyber
Issues to address international cyberspace related issues and acceptable behaviors, yet
that office was disbanded in February 2018 by then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and
has not yet been replaced as of 2020 (Marsili, 2019).
United States’ Cyber Evolution
The National Security Agency began exploiting computers and networks as early
as 1985, realizing that they must keep pace with dynamic computer and information
technological advances (Loleski, 2019). In 1994 the Agency began to define information
intelligence and computer intelligence as an offshoot to the already established signals
intelligence on which the Agency was founded (Loleski, 2019). Still, in 1997 the Senate
Intelligence Committee questioned the National Security Agency’s ability to adapt to
technological advancements in a punitive report (Loleski, 2019). As a result, in 1999 the
National Security Agency began agency wide reorganization and replaced their passive
signals intelligence collection concept with a new active digital hacking network
intelligence concept (Loleski, 2019).
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United States cyber espionage operations were largely made public through Julian
Assange’s WikiLeaks and through former National Security Agency contractor Edward
Snowden (Shad, 2018; Hellmuth, 2018a). Information amongst the hundreds of
thousands of classified documents that WikiLeaks released in 2010 suggested that the
United States was spying on foreign government officials (Shad, 2018). Further,
Snowden’s 2013 leaks revealed that the United States conducted thousands of cyber
operations against both hostile and friendly states (Hellmuth, 2018b; Shad, 2018).
Finally, it is assumed that the United States and Israel were responsible for the Stuxnet
computer virus in 2010 that damaged centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility which
likely caused significant damage to Iran’s nuclear program (Nye, 2017; Shad, 2018). The
Stuxnet attack is notable because it was the first cyberattack to cause physical damage to
a government operated critical infrastructure facility (Dinniss, 2018; Osawa, 2017).
Notable States’ Cyber Praxes
States are increasingly exploiting cyberspace to achieve political and military
objectives including information operations, espionage, propaganda, and attacks against
critical infrastructure (Shad, 2018). A wide range of cyberattacks occur against an even
wider range of targets throughout the world. More than 10 million daily attacks are
attempted against the Pentagon alone (Nye, 2017). A vast majority of these cyberattacks
are inconsequential, yet some are destructive and demand the attention of governments to
formulate potential responses (Nye, 2017). Security experts believe that the United
States, the United Kingdom, Israel, Russia, and China have the ability to conduct
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offensive cyber operations and are thus known as cyber superpowers while North Korea
and Iran are also aggressively pursuing offensive cyber capabilities (Shad, 2018).
Russia
Russia has demonstrated on multiple occasions that it will continue to conduct
cyber operations against a range of targets in many different countries (Mazanec, 2016).
Cyberwarfare is an important aspect of Russian military operations and the country
invests immense amounts of resources to increase cyberattack capabilities (Baram &
Menashri, 2019). Russia initially limited its cyberattacks to post-Soviet states but has also
begun to engage the West following President Vladimir Putin’s rise to power in 2012
(Shad, 2018).
In fact, the first instance of a state-sponsored cyberattack was conducted by
Russia against Estonia in 2007 which stemmed from Estonia’s removal of a Red Army
statue (Hodgkinson, 2018; Osawa, 2017). Russia responded with a series of cyberattacks
by successfully shutting down many of Estonia’s important government and institutional
websites as well as all banking services for two of Estonia’s largest banks (Osawa, 2017).
A year later, in 2008 Russia was accused of a more complex cyberattack that
compromised over 300 Lithuanian websites with pro-Russian messages and symbols
(Osawa, 2017). Also, in 2008 vast denial-of-service attacks, or information flooding,
were seen in Georgia to coincide with the invasion of Russian troops which shut down
many important websites (Nye, 2017; Osawa, 2017). Lastly, in 2009 Kyrgyzstan’s two
largest internet companies providing over 80% of the country’s internet received
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sustained Russian denial-of-service attacks and were forced to temporarily cut service
(Osawa, 2017).
Russia was again accused of a series cyberattacks, this time against Ukraine, in
2015 following the annexation of Crimea (Kosseff, 2018; Osawa, 2017). Russia initially
targeted a power grid company which caused 225,000 Ukrainian citizens to temporarily
lose power on Christmas Day (Nye, 2017; Osawa, 2017). This attack was notable because
it was the first proven cyberattack by one country against the critical infrastructure of
another (Osawa, 2017). A similar cyberattack occurred a year later in 2016 in the
Ukrainian capital of Kiev after which Ukraine declared that Russia was conducting a
cyberwar against them (Osawa, 2017). Still, Ukraine was again attacked six months later
in 2017 (Efrony & Shany, 2018; Osawa, 2017). This cyberattack was known as the
Petya/NotPetya attack and targeted Ukrainian government agencies, banks, power grids,
and railway and subway systems (Efrony & Shany, 2018; Osawa, 2017). Petya/NotPetya
spread globally and affected more than 60 countries, including the United States, and
companies reported losses in the hundreds of millions of dollars (Efrony & Shany, 2018).
The United States called this cyberattack the most costly and destructive in history up to
that point (Efrony & Shany, 2018). At the same time Russia was interfering with
Ukrainian computer networks, they were also directly targeting United States’ systems.
Russia was accused of manipulating public opinion to sway the 2016 U.S.
presidential election by using social networking services to display fake media and by
leaking inside information against the Democratic National Committee (Osawa, 2017).
Russia also hacked into voting related databases and systems in 39 U.S. states (Kosseff,
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2018). The United States accused Russia of state involvement in these cyberattacks and
released a report directly identifying President Putin as the approver (Shad, 2018). As a
result, President Obama expelled 35 Russian diplomats from the United States, closed
two Russian backed facilities, and levied targeted economic sanctions against Russia
itself (Efrony & Shany, 2018; Shad, 2018; Wilner, 2020). In fact, from 2007 to 2017
there were 34 known state-sponsored cyberattacks including eight against the United
States (Osawa, 2017).
In 2018 the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation warned that, beginning in 2014, Russian government cyber actors had
targeted many aspects of U.S. critical infrastructure such as water supply, aviation, and
nuclear power plant systems of which 90% are privately owned (Weiss & Jankauskas,
2018). Following this revelation, the United States imposed sanctions and indictments
against 12 Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) operatives, Russian government
hackers, and 17 government officials with close ties to President Putin (Efrony & Shany,
2018).
China
China initially developed and expanded its military cyber capabilities to use for
asymmetrical advantages (Baram & Menashri, 2019). Yet, the country now incorporates
cyber technologies in all national security initiatives in the economic, diplomatic, and
military realms (Mazanec, 2016). China’s cyber capabilities are thus postured for
economic damage, critical infrastructure attacks, and kinetic conflict (Mazanec, 2016).
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However, China only regularly conducts cyber espionage and, unlike Russia, has shown
restraint in damaging cyberattacks (Mazanec, 2016).
The U.S. government believes China began conducting U.S. intellectual property
theft through cyberspace as early as 2002 including intrusions in the Department of
Defense network (Mori, 2019). In fact, a 2013 investigation uncovered at least 141
Chinese military cyberattacks against U.S. government and civilian agencies (Mazanec,
2016). Many other countries also accuse China of cyber espionage including Australia,
Canada, and India. The United States classified China as the most active international
perpetrator of espionage in 2014 after five Chinese military hackers were indicted by the
Department of Justice for cyber exploitation within the United States (Mazanec, 2016).
In 2015 the United States and China appeared to come to agreement on certain
aspects of cybercrime by mutually banning intellectual property theft, yet there was no
mention of cyber espionage which both countries generally recognize as fair game
(Mazanec, 2016). However, there is evidence that China’s exploitation cyberattacks
against the United States continue and China is thus still considered the main cyber threat
to the United States (Mazanec, 2016; Tabansky, 2018). Because of this, since 2018 the
United States has shifted away from engagement and even imposed a series of tariffs on
China that affected 67% of Chinese imports while China reciprocated by levying tariffs
on 60% of U.S. imports (Congressional Research Service, 2019; Mori, 2019).
North Korea
North Korea has been developing offensive cyber weapons mainly to augment its
outdated conventional military force (Boo, 2017). North Korea is one of the poorest
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countries in the world with only a few thousand computers connected to its rudimentary
internet (Boo, 2017). Yet, the country has still been able to launch complex cyberattacks
against the United States and South Korea (Boo, 2017).
In 2013 South Korea faced a sophisticated cyberattack against its television
stations and three major banks which were taken offline for several hours (Osawa, 2017).
South Korea blamed North Korea for the attack which occurred during increased tensions
on the Korean Peninsula (Osawa, 2017). A year later, in 2014 North Korea infiltrated
nearly half of Sony Pictures Entertainment’s computers and servers located in the United
States and publicly released scores of confidential information which resulted in the
United States levying additional sanctions against the country (Kosseff, 2018; Osawa,
2017; White, 2016). These North Korean hackers, known as Guardians of Peace, were
also accused of cyberattacks against South Korean targets, including a nuclear power
plant, in 2015 and 2016 (Efrony & Shany, 2018). Lastly, North Korea was blamed for the
2017 WannaCry cyberattack which affected hundreds of thousands of computers in over
150 countries including Russia, China, the United States, and the United Kingdom
(Efrony & Shany, 2018). This ransomware attack encrypted data on affected systems
which could only be unlocked with a Bitcoin ransom payment (Efrony & Shany, 2018).
Iran
From 2011 to 2013 the United States witnessed a total of 176 days of Iranian
cyberattacks against 46 U.S. financial institutions including the New York Stock
Exchange, the Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and AT&T (Efrony & Shany, 2018). The
cyberattacks, known as Operation Ababil, were conducted by a self-proclaimed Arab
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Muslim group named Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Fighters (Efrony & Shany, 2018). In 2016
the United States accused Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps of these attacks in
addition to infiltrating the command and control systems of the Bowman Dam in New
York three years earlier (Hodgkinson, 2018). However, the head of Iran’s cyber police
denied responsibility for these attacks (Efrony & Shany, 2018).
Iran was also suspected of accessing Sands Casino computer systems in 2014
which significantly affected the casino’s operations (Efrony & Shany, 2018). The
casino’s owner, Sheldon Adelson, stated a year earlier that he wanted to detonate a
nuclear bomb in the Iranian desert to demonstrate U.S. strength which was likely the
catalyst for the cyberattack (Efrony & Shany, 2018). The Sands Casino cyberattack
occurred nine months before North Korea’s Sony Entertainment cyberattack making the
Ababil operation the first destructive cyberattack by a state against a private U.S.
company (Efrony & Shany, 2018).
Terrorism
By the late 19th century, advances in technology and communication offered
inexpensive travel and near instantaneous information flow (Rapoport, 2016). These
advances, in part, allowed the rise of global terrorism which began in the 1880s with the
spread of the Russian anarchist movement to other countries (Rapoport, 2013). The end
of the 19th century witnessed many anarchist motivated shootings and bombings which
included the assassinations of a French president and an Italian king (Hughes, 2011). Yet,
Russian Tsar Alexander II’s assassination in 1881 was the most famous and inspired
revolutionary violence throughout the country and subsequently the world (Hughes,
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2011). However, the anarchist movement was only the beginning element of modern
terrorism.
David Rapoport (2013) argued that the world has subsequently witnessed three
new characterizations of terrorism that developed throughout the 21st century with the
emergence of ani-colonialism terrorism, revolutionary terrorism, and the current religious
terrorism. He explained that each of these waves last approximately a generation and
appear in expansion and contraction cycles, including the current religious wave
(Rapoport, 2013). A wave contracts when organizations can no longer inspire successor
groups, or groups change tactics to become relevant in another wave (Rapoport, 2013).
However, organizations can also transcend multiple waves such as the still active Irish
Republican Army which emerged in 1916 (Rapoport, 2013).
The main goal of every terrorist organization in every wave is revolution to either
encourage national self-determination, construct a new form of authority, or inspire a new
source of legitimacy (Rapoport, 2013). Religion has always played an important role in
modern terrorism since ethnic and religious identities often overlap (Rapoport, 2013).
However, the current wave of religious terrorism is centered around Islam and aims for a
religious state as opposed to a secular one (Rapoport, 2013). Yet, there are still many
active and dangerous nonreligious terrorist groups including state-sponsored terrorist
organizations. For example, nonreligious terrorist groups make up approximately 20% of
the U.S. Department of State’s Foreign Terrorist Organizations list containing over 80
different groups as of 2020 and should thus also be considered in U.S. counterterrorism
guidelines (Bureau of Counterterrorism, n.d.).

42
States began drafting legislation against terrorism related acts in the 18th century
stemming from the French Revolution of 1789 to 1799 (Rich, 2013; Shor, 2016). Laws
largely included the term terrorism by the 20th century, and a new wave of
counterterrorism legislation appeared in the 21st century following the attacks of 9/11
(Shor, 2016). Seventeen international conventions have convened since 1920 to discuss
terrorism, yet none developed an agreed definition of the term reflecting states’ desires to
retain domestic control of the meaning to preserve unilateral response options (Fidler,
2016; Marsili, 2019). Terrorism then is a subjective term that has evolved over time and
varies in meaning depending on the endorsing party (Hellmuth, 2018b). Yet, terrorism is
generally defined as violence against civilians by non-state actors to obtain a political
objective (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2019; Hoffman, 2017). Examples of terrorism include
politically motivated bombings, kidnappings, armed attacks, and assassinations
(Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2019).
Modern terrorism research began in the 1960s and 1970s focusing on Algeria and
Indochina (Rich, 2013; Roberts, 2015). Terrorism and counterterrorism literature have
continued to grow and are now included in the studies of international relations, politics,
history, and sociology (Roberts, 2015). However, terrorism study is still controversial
which is highlighted by the fact that no absolute terrorism definition exists (Hoffman,
2017; Roberts, 2015). Additionally, terrorism methodologies are also questioned since
researchers are unable to produce significant datasets on individual terrorists which
leaves the data open to criticism (Roberts, 2015).
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There are also conflicting opinions on the effectiveness of counterterrorism
legislation (Shor, 2016). Some believe this legislation allows states to protect themselves
by drafting response plans for both preemptive deterrence and to rapidly execute
following an attack (Shor, 2016). Others feel that counterterrorism legislation has no
effect on terrorist actions and that countries mainly adopt these policies for a variety of
political reasons other than fighting terrorism (Shor, 2016). A final group believes that
counterterrorist legislation makes terrorism worse since the legislation violates human
rights, creates criticisms, and advertises post-attack responses to potential adversaries
(Shor, 2016).
International Response
Direct conflict amongst states has largely given way to proxy wars and statesponsored terrorism since the mid-20th century. The United States has been in scores of
conflicts since World War II but most recently issued a war declaration in 1942 against
Bulgaria, Hungry, and Romania. Additionally, terrorist organizations have risen from
within states to counter what they view as outside threats or internal suppression. The UN
Charter’s first purpose is to maintain peace and security worldwide, and the Organization
has realized the need to adapt to evolving international conflicts (UN, 1945). The UN has
therefore updated their doctrine to counter terrorist organizations in order to fulfil their
Charter obligations (Hansen et al., 2020).
The UN first discussed terrorism in September 2001 with Security Council
Resolution 1373 that established a mandate for all member-states to address terrorism
(Karlsrud, 2017). Further, the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine drafted in 2005 and the
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Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy created in 2006 improved civilian protection and
peacekeeper integration for UN counterterrorism efforts (Hansen et al., 2020; Karlsrud,
2017). The UN’s definition of terrorism also changed to violent extremism and, in 2015,
then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued his Plan of Action to Prevent Violent
Extremism (Karlsrud, 2017). UN peacekeeping missions have likewise evolved to aid
counterterrorism efforts (Karlsrud, 2017).
The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, deployed in
2013, was the first insertion of a UN peacekeeping force during an already ongoing
counterterrorism operation (Karlsrud, 2017). UN forces, working closely with the French
operation, were tasked with regaining control of terrorist held areas in Mali (Hansen et
al., 2020; Karlsrud, 2017). The UN has therefore been in ongoing and open conflict with
various terrorist groups and has suffered 227 fatalities as of October 2020 making the
Mali mission the deadliest in UN history (Fatalities, n.d.; Hansen et al., 2020).
NATO has also played a role in expanding global counterterrorism frameworks in
line with UN policies (Federica, 2018). The Alliance accepted its first Military Concept
for Defence against Terrorism in 2002 in reaction to Article 5’s invocation (Federica,
2018). NATO further released its Counter Terrorism Policy Guidelines in 2012 focusing
on building capabilities and strengthening partner engagement and created a robust
Action Plan in 2017 to review NATO’s current counterterrorism strategy and
recommendations for future actions (Federica, 2018). The Military Concept for Defence
against Terrorism was updated in 2015 to include the 2006 UN Global Counter Terrorism
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Strategy and the 2012 Policy Guidelines which allows NATO to contribute more
efficiently to counterterrorism operations (Federica, 2018).
In 2016 NATO acknowledged that terrorism represented a direct threat to all
member states which led to the 2017 Action Plan (Federica, 2018). This plan recognizes
that every state has different approaches to terrorism and thus allows states to retain
authority for their own domestic security while offering ways that the Alliance can still
provide value (Federica, 2018). Since 2017 NATO has taken many steps to counter
terrorism threats including establishing a Terrorism Intelligence Cell, creating a common
biometric data policy, and generally working with regional and international
organizations such as the UN, the European Union, and the African Union to improve
cooperation efforts (Federica, 2018). The Action Plan, updated in 2018, also continues to
support military operations in Afghanistan that began with the International Security
Assistance Force in 2001 (Federica, 2018).
The UN Security Council established the NATO led International Security
Assistance Force in December 2001 with Resolution 1386 which was initially focused on
Kabul, Afghanistan but spread throughout the country by 2006 (Hellmuth, 2018a). This
mission concluded in 2015 and was replaced with the Resolute Support Mission which is
considered a non-combat training operation for Afghanistan’s security forces and
institutions (Federica, 2018). NATO has also been training and advising members of
Iraq’s government and military since 2018 at the request of the country’s prime minister
(Federica, 2018). In fact, NATO forces have been conducting counter-ISIS operations in
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Iraq since 2015 which was officially sanctioned by the Alliance’s 2017 Action Plan
(Federica, 2018).
United States’ Response
Terrorism has become a household name in the United States as a result of 9/11.
The word terrorism itself invokes strong feelings for many U.S. citizens shaped by
personal experiences and patriotism. Whether through ignorance or apathy, the U.S.
government has not accurately defined or categorized terrorism amongst its many laws
and guidelines despite the term persisting for as long as the United States itself.
The United States reduced terrorism research funding following the collapse of
Soviet Union affiliated terrorist organizations in the 1990s despite the proliferation of
religious terrorist groups beginning in the 1980s (Hellmuth, 2018a; Rapoport, 2016).
Consequently, U.S. government reports attributed the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in
Tanzania and Kenya and the 9/11 attacks partially on government indifference toward
terrorist organizations (Rapoport, 2016).
In retaliation for the embassy attacks, the United States bombed a training camp
in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan (Hellmuth, 2018a). However, this
was an exception to U.S. counterterrorism policy at the time since the 1996 Khobar
Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia by Hezbollah and the al Qaeda led suicide attack
against the USS Cole in 2000 only generated criminal investigations and indictments
(Hellmuth, 2018a). However, the United States response to the 9/11 attacks was swift and
aggressive and would have lasting consequences for years to come when combined with
the political fallout and subsequent military interventions that followed.
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The United States has concentrated on preventing terrorism from reaching its
borders since 2001 through multiple invasions, housing detainees offshore, and creating
sweeping legislative reform (Hellmuth, 2018a; Roberts, 2015). The Patriot Act was
passed six weeks after 9/11 making terrorism data collection and cross-agency
information sharing improvements as well as expanding investigative authority for
government agencies (Hellmuth, 2018a). In November 2001 President Bush signed a
Military Order authorizing convictions through military commissions and indefinite
detention of al Qaeda detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Hellmuth, 2018a). Further,
the Department of Homeland security was created in November 2002 which consolidated
22 domestic protection agencies such as the U.S. Coast Guard, the Secret Service, and the
Transportation Security Administration (Hellmuth, 2018a). The last initial reform was the
2004 Intelligence Reform Act that broadly affected U.S. federal terrorism laws and
established the cabinet-level position of the Director of National Intelligence to
coordinate U.S. intelligence efforts (Hellmuth, 2018a). Yet, the country did meet internal
resistance to some counterterrorism measures.
The executive branch’s 2002 Homeland Security Act, 2005 Patriot
Reauthorization Acts, and 2008 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendment Act all
met some form of congressional resistance (Hellmuth, 2018a). Additionally, in 2004 the
U.S. Supreme Court established jurisdiction in Guantanamo Bay by agreeing that
detainees had writ of habeas corpus rights, or determining the validity of detention, and
also required a mandate for the military commissions prosecuting detainees (Hellmuth,
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2018a). Congress subsequently passed the 2006 Military Commissions Act in an attempt
to counter these Supreme Court measures (Hellmuth, 2018a).
The United States also began more closely monitoring border security and
tightening visa programs as measures to keep potential terrorists out of the country
(Hellmuth, 2018a). Additional programs were created or improved to monitor the status
of foreigners once in the country such as the 2003 Student and Exchange Visitor
Information system to track foreigners, the 2004 Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
Technology program to store biometric data, and the 2009 Electronic System for Travel
Authorization approval program (Hellmuth, 2018a). Other measures included no-fly lists
and physical border fences (Hellmuth, 2018a). All initial government effort was focused
on keeping foreign terrorists out of the United States and closely monitoring foreigners
suspected of being terrorists.
The United States did not begin focusing on domestic religious terrorism until
2009 (Hellmuth, 2018a). However, 16 Islamic lone-wolf terrorism attacks have been
attempted in the United States since 2009 including the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings
and the 2015 and 2016 mass shootings in San Bernardino and Orlando, respectively
(Hellmuth, 2018a; Jasko et al., 2017; Rapoport, 2016). The only surviving perpetrator of
these attacks was Dzhokhar Tsarnaev who was found guilty of using a weapon of mass
destruction and causing damage to property resulting in death.
Other notable domestic but non-religious terrorism shootings included the 2015
Charleston church shooting by a white supremist and the 2017 congressional baseball
shooting by a political opponent. U.S. domestic terrorist attacks in the first two decades
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of the 21st century were either lone-wolf attacks or conducted by a few individuals.
Because of this, reactions focused mainly on gun control measures as opposed to
increased counterterrorism actions. This observation is relevant since a destructive U.S.
cyberterrorism attack could also be conducted by a lone-wolf domestic terrorist, and the
internet would be the weapon.
Cyberterrorism
Like terrorism, cyberterrorism has no accepted domestic or international
definition (Boys, 2018; Klein, 2015; Marsili, 2019). Scholars debate whether or not
cyberterrorism specific research should simply be incorporated into cybercrime studies
(Albahar, 2019; Boys, 2018). Nonetheless, cyberterrorism is generally defined as
terrorism in cyberspace that features attacks against computers and networks by
subnational groups or individuals through violence or fear to coerce or intimidate a
state’s government or citizens to further political or social objectives (Jenkins & Godges,
2011; Klein, 2015; Marsili, 2019; Warf & Fekete, 2016). Terrorists realize the many
advantages that can be gained in cyberspace and seek to exploit the dimension for their
own advantage.
Cyberterrorism is inexpensive considering a computer and an internet connection
is all that is typically required (Klein, 2015). The 9/11 Commission Report stated that al
Qaeda spent between $300,000 to $400,000 USD in total to carry out their four separate
attacks on September 11, 2001 (National Commission of Terrorist Attacks upon the
United States, 2004). Yet, a cyberattack of comparable caliber could be even cheaper and
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would negate all logistical obstacles making it feasible for a cyberterrorist to conduct a
devastating attack within the United States from anywhere in the world (Albahar, 2019).
Cyberterrorism is also more anonymous than conventional terrorism given the
problems of attribution following a geographically separated cyberattack (Klein, 2015).
Governments and private organizations can generally identify the source of cyberattacks
to a large degree of certainty. However, any government counterattack would require
indisputable evidence which is often difficult to produce (Tehrani, 2017).
The United States often publicly condemns Chinese hacking, has protested
Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and has blamed North Korea
for their Sony Pictures Entertainment cyber infiltration (Schulzke, 2018). Yet, officials in
each of these countries have denied any involvement, calling the accusations groundless
and false justifications for U.S. sanctions (Schulzke, 2018). It is relatively easy to
decipher the source of a kinetic attack but cyberattack evidence varies (Schulzke, 2018).
There are a far greater number of viable cyberspace targets than tangible ones
since cyberattacks render location and physical security irrelevant (Klein, 2015). It is
therefore not out of the question for cyberterrorists to strike at the core of any large
country or corporation displaying the most formidable physical defenses. Still, no
terrorist group has successfully conducted a large-scale cyberterrorism attack against the
United States as of 2020, but terrorists have made great strides exploiting the internet to
facilitate communication, fundraising, propaganda, radicalization, and recruiting
(Albahar, 2019; Dinniss, 2018; Fidler, 2016). Nevertheless, computer-assisted crime does
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not alone constitute cyberterrorism which is also distinct from cyberwarfare (Tehrani,
2017).
Cybercrime and cyberterrorism both involve illegal activities in cyberspace, yet
they have different motivations and are therefore defined differently (Tehrani, 2017).
Cybercrimes are broadly defined crimes committed by cybercriminals through
information technology with no political or social motivations (Tehrani, 2017).
Cyberterrorists, on the other hand, conduct cyberattacks using similar or identical
methods to cybercriminals but with more violent and long-term political objectives
(Dinniss, 2018). Further, non-violent cybercrimes committed for political purposes, are
generally considered acts of hacktivism, or hacking for political activism (Klein, 2015).
These hacktivists cannot be succinctly defined as cybercriminals or cyberterrorists and
operate either independently or through state direction. Lastly, cyberterrorism is also
different from cyberwarfare in that the main objective of cyberterrorism is to cause fear
and harm while cyberwarfare focuses on more specific objectives encompassing nonconventional military attacks (Tehrani, 2017).
International Preparation
Despite ongoing concerns, international law does not directly address
cyberterrorism since the lack of cyberattacks from terrorist organizations offers little
incentive to draft such legislation (Baram & Menashri, 2019; Fidler, 2016). Creating
international law related to cyberterrorism would be complex given the range of legal
issues involved with the terms terrorism and cyber and by the inclusion of rapidly
evolving technological advancements (Baram & Menashri, 2019; Boeke & Broeders,
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2018; Fidler, 2016). It is also not clear how the Geneva Conventions and the greater laws
of armed conflict apply to cyberterrorism (Marsili, 2019).
Laws regarding humane treatment in armed conflict are dictated in Common
Articles 2 and 3 of the Geneva Conventions (Marsili, 2019). Specifically, Common
Article 2 applies to international conflict between states and Common Article 3 applies to
all forms of non-international conflict (Marsili, 2019). The self-defense statutes of Article
51 of the UN Charter and Article 5 of NATO could both apply if a destructive
cyberattack comparable to a conventional attack occurred. However, international
cyberwarfare conducted by non-state actors, such as cyberterrorists, does not fit neatly in
the Geneva Conventions since Common Article 2 applies only to state conflict and
Common Article 3 applies only to non-international conflict (Marsili, 2019). Therefore,
there is no common article directly addressing international conflict by non-state actors
which gives individual states discretion on how to apply elements of the Geneva
Conventions; such as how the United States currently characterizes unlawful enemy
combatants in the country’s current War on Terrorism.
United States’ Preparation
Attacks against U.S. infrastructure are not uncommon, but none have qualified as
cyberterrorism as of 2020 (Klein, 2015). However, criminals continue to sell increasingly
destructive black-market hacking tools and terrorist organizations are successfully
achieving goals through cyber means making cyberterrorism attacks more probable
(Klein, 2015; Nye, 2017). The United States has no domestic laws relating to a largescale cyberterrorism attack thereby forcing the country to prosecute cyberterrorists using
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existing cybercrime or terrorism legislation (Tehrani, 2017). Domestic cyberterrorists
would likely be tried through domestic law, but the issue becomes more complicated for
international cyberterrorists.
The United States could deem transnational cyberterrorism attacks as cybercrimes
under U.S. Code, Title 18, section 1030 Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with
Computers (Tehrani, 2017). In this case, the United States could extradite offenders for
domestic trials or apply extraterritorial jurisdiction to try cyberterrorists in absentia. The
maximum fine for section 1030 offenses is 20 years imprisonment, though damage
causing death would fall under section 225 of the Homeland Security Act amending
section 1030 to authorize a lifetime sentence (Tehrani, 2017). Additionally, the Patriot
Act discusses cyberterrorism in section 814. However, this section only relates to
computer fraud offensives and would not be applicable to a large-scale cyberterrorism
attack (Podgor, 2002). The United States could also declare international perpetrators of a
destructive cyberterrorist attack terrorists. Assuming civilian deaths, these individuals
would likely be accused of war crimes and be tried through military tribunals as unlawful
enemy combatants. U.S. cyberterrorism legislation is incomplete, yet the country is not
ignorant to the dangers of cyberterrorism.
Domestic Concerns. Many critical infrastructure control systems are susceptible
to cyberterrorist attacks since the systems’ complexities make eliminating all weaknesses
virtually impossible (Klein, 2015). In 2012 then U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta
warned that the United States was becoming increasingly vulnerable to extremist attacks
that could harm the country’s financial networks, transportation systems, and power grids

54
(Naím, 2017; Nye, 2017). Further, in 2013 the Department of Defense’s Science Board
stated that the country should not assume that critical systems can be defended from a
well-resourced cyberattack (Mazanec, 2016). In 2014 then Director of National
Intelligence, James Clapper, even ranked cyber threats above terrorism as the top U.S.
security risk (Tabansky, 2018). Realizing these vulnerabilities, in 2015 the Department of
Defense began crafting a cyber deterrence strategy that greatly expanded offensive
capabilities (Osawa, 2017; Wilner, 2020). Still, in 2016 Mr. Clapper stated that evolving
cyber capabilities were outpacing a common understanding of its norms of behavior
which could increase the chances of misunderstandings and lead to unintentional
escalation (Mazanec, 2016). The Defense Science Board also reaffirmed their position in
2017 stating that offensive cyber capabilities of potential adversaries will likely far
exceed the United States’ ability to defend them for the next five to ten years (Wilner,
2020).
Deterrence
History continues to witness the evolution of warfare. New technologies forge
innovative offensive weapons that are immensely successful at first until comparable
deterrence is created through like modernization and policy. Deterrence typically
involves the threat of punishment through retaliation and works best against rational and
predictable adversaries (Wilner, 2020). U.S. deterrence has significantly evolved since
2003 and currently focuses on near-peer adversaries, rogue and weak states possessing
limited weapons of mass destruction, and violent non-state actors (Wilner, 2020). Yet,
cyber deterrence on an international level can be complex and must draw from elements
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of national security, international crime, espionage, and international conflict
(Matwyshyn, 2018; Wilner, 2020).
Joseph Nye lists the four factors of cyberspace deterrence as the threat of
retaliation, denial, fear of entanglement, and norms (Nye, 2017; Shad, 2018). Attribution
is the main barrier to cyber retaliation needed for deterrence by punishment since it is
often difficult to identify both the attacker and the source of the cyberattack (Hodgkinson,
2018; Nye, 2017; Shad, 2018). Deterrence by denial is best realized when a state has a
resilient cyber defense capable of preventing or quickly recovering from a cyberattack
(Nye, 2017; Shad, 2018). Entanglement deterrence is supported through international
agreements such as the Budapest Convention and by international organizations such as
NATO (Shad, 2018). Lastly, norms work by naming and undermining perpetrators of
cyberattacks (Shad, 2018). U.S. cyber deterrence policy has shifted from denial under
President Bush to a punishment approach under President Obama and President Trump.
The United States regularly reviews cyber deterrence options against non-state actors and
evaluates ways to deter Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran from conducting
cyberattacks against the country (Klein, 2015). However, the number of cyberattacks
aimed at U.S. targets has steadily risen for the past 15 years (Wilner, 2020).
State and non-state actors have infiltrated U.S. systems and caused damage and
theft without crossing the government’s threshold for escalation or retaliation short of
sanctions (Bracken, 2017). These attacks, then, could either be viewed as a failure of
deterrence or falling into the gray zone between war and peace (Nye, 2017). The United
States is particularly at a disadvantage compared to cyberterrorists and authoritarian
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regimes since these organizations are not bound by legal or political constraints
(Mazanec, 2016; Naím, 2017). An asymmetry also exists in that weak, rogue, or non-state
actors with limited cyber platforms have the least to lose and the most to gain from cyber
conflict (Wilner, 2020).
Enforcement
German philosopher Immanuel Kant wrongly concluded in the late 1700s that
states would eventually seek peace through international governance due to the everincreasing violence of war (Barrett, 2017). However, international governance has yet to
materialize and existing transnational organizations are not completely in sync with
evolving threats. In practice, states prefer to preserve their relative power by conducting
actions that fall under the threshold for conflict (Barrett, 2017). Challenges that must be
overcome to increase international agreement on cyber cooperation are trust, perceptions,
and state sovereignty (Baram & Menashri, 2019). There is nearly international consensus
that cyberattacks could be considered acts of war depending on the circumstances and
that proportionality permits conventional retaliation to cyberattacks (Hodgkinson, 2018).
Relating cyberattacks to acts of war should encourage states to create robust self-defense
plans to prevent such attacks. Yet, cyber self-defense is still a new and evolving topic.
There are currently no domestic or international laws addressing self-defense in
cyberspace (Cook, 2018). However, in 2003 the United States published The Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace which implies that the country reserves the right to respond to a
cyberattack through kinetic or non-kinetic actions (Klein, 2015). Also, President
Obama’s 2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace stated that the United States will
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use all necessary means for cyberattack defense but will limit military force as a last
resort (Mazanec, 2016; Wilner, 2020). Because of this, the United States has a wide
variety of retaliatory options available including conventional options authorized solely
by the president under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Marsili, 2019). In
2012 the U.S. government stated that a cyberattack could be viewed as an armed attack
implying that the country could come to the defense of other states in accordance with
Article 51 of the UN Charter or Article 5 of NATO (Hodgkinson, 2018; Klein, 2015).
Additionally, for the first time in February 2016 the United States began
conducting open offensive military cyberattacks against ISIS to augment ongoing
conventional operations (Fidler, 2016; Hatch, 2018). The nature of these attacks remains
classified but U.S. Cyber Command targeted the terrorist organization’s ability to spread
propaganda, recruit, and control operations in Iraq and Syria (Fidler, 2016). The United
States claimed that its actions were in accordance with international law given that
domestic cyber doctrine states that all actions must conform to U.S. laws and regulations
while being cognizant of international law (Brantly, 2016; Fidler, 2016). The U.S.
military has demonstrated that active cyber operations can be effective. However, this
expertise has not yet transitioned to U.S. private businesses including operators of U.S.
critical infrastructure.
The preferred universal method of cybersecurity involves passive defense
measures such as anti-virus software and intrusion detection systems (Van Dine, 2020).
Yet, the overwhelmingly high number of successful cyberattacks suggests that passive
defense security measures could be improved (Van Dine, 2020). However, active cyber
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defense operations conducted by private U.S. corporations is currently considered illegal
without consent which also generally correlates with the Budapest Convention’s
interpretation of the issue (Cook, 2018; Van Dine, 2020). Active cyber-defense measures
would also likely be in violation of the U.S. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act that
prohibits accessing computers without authorization to obtain information, transmit code,
or cause damage (Cook, 2018).
However, members of the U.S. government are attempting to expand the cyber
powers of private industry. In 2019 Representative Tom Graves introduced a
congressional bill for the Cyber Defense Certainty Act that would grant authority for
private organizations to infiltrate the networks of their cyber attackers (H.R.3270 - Active
Cyber Defense Certainty Act, n.d.). This Act would let private companies loiter in foreign
networks to identity their attackers and discover their methods which is known as
hacking back (Cook, 2018). Hacking back is part of active cyber defense which
encompasses operating inside and outside of defenders’ networks to discover and degrade
aggressor capabilities (Cook, 2018; Van Dine, 2020).
In absence of active cyber defense measures for private U.S. industry, many feel
that public and private sector cybersecurity matters should not be siloed since a breach in
either could affect both (Healey, 2018; Matwyshyn, 2018). However, some critical
infrastructure components, such as air traffic control systems and nuclear power plants,
already encompass both public and private sector security elements known as reciprocal
security vulnerability (Matwyshyn, 2018). The private sector has also worked with
government organizations on a range of cyber related issues through public-private
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partnerships created in 1998 by President Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive 63
(Healey, 2018). Additionally, the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 provides a framework for
public and private sectors to cooperate with the intent of working toward the common
goal of cybersecurity through voluntary information sharing (Kosseff, 2018; Matwyshyn,
2018). Expanding active cyber defense into the U.S. private sector could bolster critical
infrastructure cybersecurity and reduce the number of successful cyberattacks through
measures such as hacking back and information synthesis between the public and private
sectors. However, some feel that no amount of preparation can deter a cyberterrorism
attack against the United States.
Counterarguments
A majority of cyberterrorism literature focuses on preparation and deterrence
through the direction of domestic and international laws, but other aspects suggest that
the United States will always be vulnerable to asymmetric cyberattacks (Klein, 2015).
This literature indicates that cyberattacks against U.S. public and private information
technologies is a daily occurrence and the government subsequently conducts little to no
public responses since a vast majority of the attacks are unsuccessful (Klein, 2015).
Additional counterarguments believe that cyberterrorists motivated by ideology based on
religion or factionalism that embraces death are not concerned with repercussions and
may be undeterrable (Klein, 2015). It would also be very difficult to create proportional
and creditable deterrence options against adversaries will high risk tolerances (Klein,
2015). Additionally, choosing military targets following a cyberterrorism attack from a
non-state actor could be problematic since terrorists are not bound by geographical
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borders and largely operate amongst civilians (Klein, 2015). The final counterargument is
that terrorists might even exploit any law or proportional response plan to their advantage
since they would already know the methodologies of their targets (Klein, 2015). Statefocused cyber deterrence against North Korea, Russia, and China is also occasionally
discouraged.
North Korea became a nuclear power in 2006 to presumably counter the
comparatively superior military power of the United States (Bracken, 2017). At the
opposite end of the spectrum, the country is also advancing their cyber capabilities
(Bracken, 2017). Some scholars believe that if North Korea had the ability to launch a
decisive large-scale cyberattack against United States, they would likely still refrain since
the cyberattack could easily be countered with a conventional military response from the
United States and potentially create a conflict that North Korea could not win (Bracken,
2017). Additionally, China and Russia have successfully gained territory in the South
China Sea and in Ukraine and Crimea, respectively, by operating under the threshold for
triggering U.S. and international reactions which they have a practice of doing in all
actions including in cyberspace (Bracken, 2017). These two countries would fare better
than North Korea in a conventional war with the United States, but a deadly war would
also not be in their national interests (Bracken, 2017).
The 20th century was defined by conventional wars, whereas the 21st century has
so far been dominated by asymmetric hostilities including terrorism and cyber threats.
Countless examples of failed deterrence initiatives exist throughout history which will
continue into the future against a multitude of seen and unexpected adversaries. When
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deterrence fails, having deliberate response plans could increase the chances of successful
retaliation while mitigating escalation. Adversaries might also be deterred from
aggression after examining an unpalatable but pending response. However, announcing
what cyberattacks would warrant military responses could allow adversaries to design
attacks just short of the kinetic response threshold.
Summary
The rules of war have been discussed for thousands of years but integrating cyber
and terrorism into the discussion has only recently begun following the invention of the
internet and following the 9/11 attacks. It is improbable that terrorism and cyberwarfare
will be conceptually defined at the international level any time soon since it is unlikely
that states will conclusively agree to alter existing regulations. Most states will therefore
continue to act in accordance with domestic doctrine imbedded in their own ideologies to
the frustration of others.
Currently, no country can assume victory against the U.S. military which drives
asymmetric developments for potential U.S. adversaries including cyberspace operations
and state-sponsored terrorism. Additionally, terrorist organizations continue to search for
all conceivable ways to gain advantages against much more powerful adversaries.
Because of this, cyberterrorism is developing as a dangerous new threat that has possibly
been inadequately addressed due to reasons outlined using the punctuated equilibrium
theory.
It is also unclear how the United States would react to a successful damaging
cyberterrorism attack against the country. The United States could respond to these
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attacks in a variety of ways through military or diplomatic channels using overt or covert
methods and by means of kinetic or non-kinetic actions. Therefore, more cyberterrorism
deterrence and response research might be needed to avoid reactionary decisions made in
an emotionally charged environment following a successful destructive cyberterrorism
attack.
In Chapter 2, I provided a summary of literature on all available information
concerning the development of the cyber domain and terrorism, and the U.S. and
international attitudes toward them. I also gave examples of how states have been
nefariously using cyberspace to their advantages and highlighted ambiguities in domestic
and international legislation related to the subjects. I finally identified a gap in literature
concerning the lack of cyberterrorism response guidelines and addressed why the United
States might need to preemptively draft cyberterrorism deterrence and response
guidelines. I introduce the research design and approach for the study in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore the perceptions of terrorism
and cybersecurity experts to understand how the United States might better prevent and
respond to large-scale cyberterrorism attacks. A major successful cyberterrorism attack
has never been conducted against the United States so it remains unseen what guidelines
the country will use as the basis for a response. The current lack of guidance could leave
the United States in a vulnerable position following a successful large-scale
cyberterrorism attack given the unpredictability of potential responses. Through expert
interviews, I addressed whether current policies were adequate to respond to large-scale
cyberterrorism attacks, or if additional cyberterrorism specific policies should be created
to ensure preemptive and palatable options. In Chapter 3, I discuss the research design of
the study, the rationale for the design, and the role of the researcher. I also explain the
study’s methodology including participant selection, instrumentation, and data collection
and analysis. I finally discuss issues of trustworthiness and ethical procedures.
Research Design and Rationale
Research Question: How do terrorism and cybersecurity experts perceive that the
United States might better prevent, cope with, and respond to large-scale cyberterrorism
attacks?
I chose a qualitative research design for this study. Creswell (2013) explained that
qualitative research is used to explore a problem through variables identified as a result of
direct communication with participants. The focus of this qualitative study was the
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exploration of the perceptions of U.S. terrorism and cybersecurity experts to better
understand how the country might better prevent and respond to large-scale
cyberterrorism attacks. The rationale for this approach was to give these experts latitude
to describe in their own words the applicability of better deterrence and response
guidelines for a large-scale cyberterrorism attack. I therefore collected data through
semistructured one-on-one telephone interviews. I asked open-ended questions in the
same order to all participants with the addition of follow-up and probing questions as
required to insure full answers to all questions.
Role of the Researcher
As the researcher, I was involved in all aspects of this study. I initially identified
the area of study based on my personal interests and determined that a gap in literature
existed through an exhaustive literature search. I then identified the study’s topic,
conducted a literature review to incorporate all known information on the topic, and
purposefully selected knowledgeable participants with whom I had no previous
affiliations. It was paramount that I identified potential biases and remained cognizant of
them throughout all aspects of the study to uphold the integrity of the research.
I was the sole instrument in the qualitative data collection process. I collected
data from in-depth, semistructured telephone interviews which I organized, analyzed, and
interpreted. Interview participation was voluntary, and I posed interview questions in a
neutral manner as part of an unbiased interview process. I had no personal or professional
affiliations with any participants, but I have lived the effects of 9/11 as a military member
for 15 years and therefore used bracketing strategies to address any inherent biases
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gained through previous military experiences as well as to suspend any personal views
acquired through the literature review and data collection. I lastly complied with all
guidelines outlined in Walden University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) for ethical
research.
Methodology
Participant Selection
After IRB approval, I sent prospective participants study invitations through
individual e-mail or LinkedIn messages explaining the study and selection criteria.
Participants in this study are experts in their respective government, security, or
educational career fields. Targeted participants demonstrated familiarity in the study’s
topic by previously relating their expertise to aspects of cyberterrorism. For the purposes
of this study, I defined an expert as an individual who has worked professionally in two
or all three cyber, terrorism, and national security career fields within the federal
government for at least 10 years since 2001. The timespan justification was to ensure that
participants had been active in their respective occupations since 9/11 and had practiced
their profession over the course of at least two presidencies.
I identified 89 potential participants meeting expert criteria from a multitude of
professions including government officials, professors, lawyers, cybersecurity members,
and scholars to align with the research question’s focus on the perception of experts. Of
these participants, 79% have federal government work experience, 58% hold doctoral
degrees, and 61% and 45% are cyber and terrorism professionals, respectively. I did not
identify participants by name in this study and I also did not include individual names in
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transcripts of recorded interviews. I received positive responses from nine participants.
Themes began to emerge after the first three interviews and data saturation was firmly
established after the completion of the ninth and final interview.
Instrumentation
The instrument for this study was a one-on-one semistructured telephone
interview. I chose semistructured interviews to allow leeway for script diversions for
clarifications or to grasp deeper meanings to answers. I pilot-tested interview questions
with three volunteer peers familiar with aspects of cyberterrorism before conducting
interviews with actual participants. I recruited volunteers from friends and co-workers
who were familiar with the study’s topic. I refined my interview questions and delivery
through the pilot study. Each interview, while not identical, followed the interview
protocol in Appendix A which includes the interview questions in Appendix B. I asked
follow-up questions for any clarifications and to probe for a deeper understanding of
participant responses. The interviews took between approximately 20 to 60 minutes to
complete and averaged 38 minutes each. No follow-up procedures or follow-on
interviews with the participants were required.
Procedures for Data Collection
I collected data from nine experts over a 6-week interview period from August 27
to October 3, 2020. Before beginning each interview, I established rapport with the
participant by introducing myself, discussing my background, explaining the goals and
objectives of the study, and clarifying that all shared information would remain
confidential. The participants all agreed to an informed consent which was confirmed in
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the interview protocol before each interview. Audio interview recordings were
transcribed to Microsoft Word and compared for accuracy. I then sent the transcribed
recordings to the participants to confirm the accuracy and to allow them to make changes
or add additional comments. The audio recordings were deleted after each participant
approved their transcription. Finally, I sent an Executive Study to each participant after
completion of the study along with a personalized thank you message before ceasing
communication.
Data Analysis Plan
Qualitative analysis converts data into findings after making sense of the large
quantity of data (Patton, 2015). Data analysis began after each transcript was reviewed
and returned by the participant, or after one week of no response. I linked the data
collected from the interviews to the research question and theoretical framework using
the qualitative data analysis software NVivo to identify patterns and themes.
The qualitative NVivo program is used to classify, sort, arrange, and compare
data. Using NVivo, I coded the interview data through predetermined codes and
emerging codes in order to extract ideas and categories for comparison and analysis. I
then exhaustively study all coded NVivo data to interpret categories and themes in order
to draw conclusions.
Data analysis ran concurrently with data collection during first-cycle coding to
complement the predetermined codes formed through the literature review. A robust data
management plan ensured that data were not mismanaged through proper organization
and storage. I initially hand coded the interview data to gain a deeper understanding of

68
the data as well as to identify predetermined codes and conceptualize emerging codes. I
then used NVivo to extract emergent codes and finally formulated all collected data into
themes at the completion of second-cycle coding to complete data aggregation.
Issues of Trustworthiness
I interacted with all study participants in accordance with IRB guidelines. I
obtained IRB permission to conduct research before data collection began. I handled the
data purposefully throughout the data collection process. I used a transcription service
called TranscribeMe to transpose audio recordings into verbatim Microsoft Word
documents which I then compared to the audio recordings for accuracy. All
TranscribeMe employees sign non-disclosure agreements to keep transcribed data
confidential. I deleted audio recordings after the participants approved the transcripts, and
I secured printed transcripts in a personal safe until the completion of the study after
which I destroyed them. Lastly, electronic copies of transcripts and data will be kept on a
password protected hard drive in a safe for five years before also being destroyed.
Ethical Procedures
I treated all participants with the upmost respect. I initially contacted participants
through e-mail or LinkedIn messages and conducted all subsequent contact through
private phone conversations or personal e-mail correspondence. I ensured participants
agreed to an informed consent before conducting each interview. The consent form
explained that participation was voluntary and could be stopped at any time. The form
also explained the reasoning for the study and the methods used throughout the study. It
lastly stated that personal information of each participant would be kept confidential.
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Summary
This chapter presented the research design for a qualitative study on the
applicability of improved deterrence and response guidelines for a large-scale
cyberterrorism attack. I served as the primary research instrument and gathered data
through semistructured telephone interviews. Nine participants were interviewed over a
6-week period. I extracted data from interview transcripts and subsequently coded and
analyzed the data to draw conclusions using NVivo software. I took thorough care to
ensure participants remained anonymous by properly securing data, and that all ethical
standards were followed in accordance with IRB guidelines. I present the findings of this
research in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore the perceptions of experts to
better understand how the United States might better prevent and respond to large-scale
cyberterrorism attacks. A major successful cyberterrorism attack has never been
conducted against the United States, so it remains unseen what guidelines the country
will use as the basis for a response. The current lack of guidance could leave the United
States in a vulnerable position following a successful large-scale cyberterrorism attack
given the unpredictability of potential responses. Through expert interviews, I addressed
whether current policies are adequate to address large-scale cyberterrorism attack
preparation and response guidelines, or if additional cyberterrorism specific policies
should be created to ensure preemptive and palatable options.
A single research question guided this study: How do terrorism and cybersecurity
experts perceive that the United States might better prevent, cope with, and respond to
large-scale cyberterrorism attacks? One hundred and twelve peer-reviewed articles
supported the findings of this study. A detailed literature review of all publicly available
information related to cyberterrorism confirmed that the U.S. government has not openly
considered prevention and response strategies for a large-scale terrorism attack. The
scope of this study was nationwide, and 89 potential participants meeting expert criteria
were contacted after IRB approval. Positive responses were received from nine experts
which was slightly less than the predicted 11 responses calculated using an eight to one
response rate.
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I pilot-tested interview questions with three volunteer peers familiar with aspects
of cyberterrorism from August 25–26, 2020 after IRB approval (08-24-20-0531149) but
before conducting interviews with actual participants. I refined my interview questions
and delivery through the pilot study, but I made no changes to data analysis strategies.
The nine participants were then interviewed over a 6-week period from August 27 to
October 3, 2020.
In Chapter 4, I discuss the results obtained from the analysis of primary data
gathered through semistructured telephone interviews. This chapter begins with the
setting and demographics. I then give a detailed description of the coding strategies used
for data collection and data analysis before concluding with evidence of trustworthiness
and the major themes cultivated from data analysis.
Study Setting
I conducted semistructured telephone interviews at a date and time of the
participants’ choosing in order to give them the opportunity to identify a comfortable
setting where they could respond fully and freely without time restrictions. All
participants chose weekdays during normal work hours. I also recorded the interviews in
various private and secluded settings with strong mobile phone and internet reception. All
interviews were therefore completed with no distractions, interruptions, or time
constraints as confirmed by a review of the verbatim transcripts. The participants did not
identify any personal or organizational commitments that would have influenced them at
the time of this study.
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Demographics
Participant criteria for this study included experts who have worked
professionally in two or all three cyber, terrorism, and national security career fields
within the federal government for at least 10 years since September 2001. The timespan
justification was to ensure that participants were active in their respective occupations
since 9/11 and have practiced their profession over the course of at least two
presidencies. I gathered data from nine experts with past federal government experience
and with 138 and 72 years of cumulative cyber and terrorism experience, respectively.
Demographics such as age, race, religion, and gender were not considered relevant to
answering the research question. Applicable participant demographics are listed in Table
1.
Table 1
Demographics of Participants
Participant Education
ID
level
E1
Doctorate
B2
Doctorate
P3
Doctorate
C4
Doctorate
T5
Doctorate
J6
Doctorate
A7
Masters
T8
Doctorate
P9
Doctorate

Years of experience
cyber
terrorism
0
12
14
40
13
0
20
0
21
0
6
12
0
5
35
3
29
0

Fed govt
experience
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Present
profession
Professor
Consultant
Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity
Military
Professor
Researcher
Professor
Government
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Data Collection
Walden University granted IRB approval for this study on August 24, 2020 with
approval number 08-24-20-0531149. Following this approval, I sent invitation letters to
89 potential participants through individual e-mail and LinkedIn messages and received
responses until September 17, 2020. I collected data from nine participants using
semistructured telephone interviews from August 27 to October 3, 2020. I asked
clarifying questions propagated from participant answers to the semistructured interview
questions located in Appendix B in order to gain a complete understanding of each
answer as well as to explore deeper meanings to answers. The interviews ranged from 20
to 61 minutes, averaged 38 minutes, and totaled 5 hours and 48 minutes. I recorded each
interview on a digital voice recorder which I then downloaded to a password protected
external hard drive. I secured this hard drive in a personal safe when not in use. I had the
recordings transcribed verbatim to Microsoft Word using the transcription service
TranscribeMe which yielded 108 pages of transcriptions. I compared the recordings to
each transcription to ensure accuracy before deleting the recordings. I then sent the
transcriptions to the participants to make any changes they felt necessary. Only one
participant responded with edits. Data collection went as planned and no unusual
circumstances were encountered. Individual interview details are described in Table 2.
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Table 2
Interview Statistics
Participant
ID
E1
B2
P3
C4
T5
J6
A7
T8
P9

Date of
interview
27 Aug 20
28 Aug 20
28 Aug 20
03 Sep 30
11 Sep 20
29 Sep 20
30 Sep 20
02 Oct 20
03 Oct 20

Duration Transcribed
(h.m.s)
pages
0.41.52
12
1.01.42
15
0.35.14
13
0.48.43
15
0.47.17
13
0.28.39
12
0.26.32
9
0.20.01
7
0.38.08
13
Data Analysis

Participant transcriptions were exported into NVivo software which I used as a
data analysis aid. I then subsequently coded the transcriptions to highlight patterns in the
data to generate categories which were analyzed for connections. Saldaña (2016)
explained that qualitative data coding involves dividing, grouping, reorganizing, and
linking codes in order to search for meanings and to develop explanations. Coding for
this study was an iterative process that utilized both precodes and emergent codes. I
incorporated a variety of coding methods selected to best synthesize data throughout the
coding process.
I formed precodes during literature review which I chose based on the study’s
research question, framework, and approach. I used the structural coding method for
precodes which resembled broad topics gathered for the purpose of more detailed
analysis (Saldaña, 2016). I reviewed all transcripts exclusively for precodes before
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emergent codes were identified. The precode list was based on the interview questions
and comprised of the following codes: awareness alignment, common understanding,
cyberattack probability, cyberattack understanding, decision-maker priorities,
international law, national security priorities, policy issue drivers, policymaker
perceptions, possible responses, precautionary measures, and U.S. preparations.
Precodes allowed me to loosely sort the data by research question in order to approach
the data from another perspective.
I then identified emergent codes through coding and recoding in both first and
second-cycle coding. Saldaña (2016) explained that first-cycle coding is initial coding
that is used as a baseline to see what direction the study will take. I incorporated in vivo
and process coding methods in first-cycle coding. In vivo codes, or verbatim codes, are
generated from the actual language of participants and are identified by quotation marks.
Process coding focuses on the changing and repetition of action as well as the disruptions
that occur within human goal setting or problem-solving interactions and are identified
with gerunds (Saldaña, 2016). I used the process coding method judiciously in this study
for coding punctuated equilibrium theory related participant responses.
I recoded the transcripts using first-cycle coding methods to ensure that all
emergent codes were applied throughout each transcript. First-cycle in vivo and process
coding generated 232 emergent codes. I then used second-cycle coding to reorganize and
reanalyze data gathered through first-cycle coding methods. Here, I predominately used
pattern coding which condensed codes into a smaller number of categories by merging
codes together while dropping others. Saldaña (2016) recommended 50 to 100 total
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codes, 15 to 20 categories, and five to seven major themes. Data analysis for this study
produced results similar to Saldaña’s recommendation with 87 total codes grouped into
11 categories and six major themes.
First and second cycle coding development is illustrated in Figure 1. The study’s
themes, categories, and respective code sums are presented in Appendix C which also
lists amplifying information of all 87 second cycle codes including participant
contributions, interview questions utilized, and associated first cycle code frequencies.
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Figure 1
Code Development

First Cycle Coding
emergent codes
210
in vivo codes

22
process codes

232

Second Cycle Coding
23 dropped
in vivo codes
187
in vivo codes

22
process codes

209

final codes
28
in vivo codes

28
in vivo codes

48
pattern codes

55
pattern codes

7 pattern codes
4 process codes

Total Codes

87

4 process codes
87

Discrepant Cases
Two discrepant cases involving one participant emerged from the study. This
participant believed that terrorists do not need state assistance to conduct a large-scale
cyberterrorism attack and also believed that a large-scale cyberterrorism attack was likely
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in the near future. Six other participants disagreed with this assessment and felt that state
assistance is required to conduct a large-scale cyberterrorism attack although any attack is
unlikely. The divergent participant contributed to data saturation in all other areas despite
deviating from the majority in the identified discrepant cases.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
I achieved trustworthiness of this study through acknowledging discrepant cases
as well as through credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability.
Credibility
Credibility in a qualitative study relates to the degree that the results reflect the
experiences of the participants. To facilitate open and honest responses, I ensured that
participants were aware that no identifying information would be used in the study and
that they could opt out at any stage. I also ensured that all data were creditable by
comparing each transcription to its audio recording for complete accuracy. I then sent the
transcriptions to the participants to review and edit before using the final transcriptions
for data analysis. Additionally, each potential participant went through multiple iterations
of scrutiny before being included in the final list of 89 experts which resulted in the
elimination of 61 individuals from the original 150-member list.
Transferability
Transferability of this study is possible since I described in detail the rationale,
structure, and justification of the study, as well as participant demographics. While the
participants were not directly identified in this study, I provided sufficient detail to
highlight their levels of expertise. Cyberterrorism and U.S. interventions are respectively
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global and nationwide by definition. The transferability of this study is therefore possible
to a multitude of government, cyber, and terrorism focused organizations throughout the
world.
Dependability
I ensured the dependability of this study by aligning the research question to the
study’s problem and purpose. I also derived the interview questions from the purpose of
the study while considering the study’s theoretical foundation. Additionally, I conducted
an exhaustive literature and located 112 predominately peer-reviewed journal articles
using detailed search criteria in multiple databases. I also remained cognizant of the
scope of the study through the iterative and thorough data analysis process.
Conformability
Lastly, conformability relates to the objectivity of the study. I was exclusively
responsible for all data collection and analysis. I first collected data in an objective
manner after identifying potential researcher biases and implemented bracketing
techniques. I then coded data using precodes and emergent codes through primary and
secondary cycle coding and recoding. This iterative coding process resulted in five
coding revisions for each transcript to ensure that all data were objectively extracted.
Study Results
Six themes emerged from the data analysis relating to the study’s single research
question: How do terrorism and cybersecurity experts perceive that the United States
might better prevent, cope with, and respond to large-scale cyberterrorism attacks? Five
of the six themes contained two or more categories which resulted in 11 categories
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containing 87 total codes for the study as seen in Figure 2. A detailed code list is located
in Appendix C.
Figure 2
Themes, Categories, and Codes
Themes

Categories

Codes

Terrorists’ Cyber
Capabilities

6

Large-Scale Cyberterrorism
Attack Probability

Low Probability
Activity Below War Threshold

4
6

Large-Scale Cyberterrorism
Attack Likely Responses

Attribution Considerations
Lethal Response

6
2

Cyberterrorism Prevention
Measures

Collective Coordination
Preparation

17
15

Cyberterrorism Policy
Agendas

Technical Knowledge
Policymaker Consciousness
Agenda Change Factors

4
18
3

International Cyberterrorism
Considerations

International Law Validity
International Law Integration

2
4

Data were generated from nine participants through 18 interview questions
located in Appendix B. All interview questions were aligned with the research question
by considering the study’s problem, purpose, structure, and theoretical foundation. The
six themes generated from data analysis are as follows:
Theme 1: Terrorists’ Cyber Capabilities
The first theme that emerged was related to the current cyber capabilities of
terrorist organizations. The literature review indicated that terrorist organizations are
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capable of successfully manipulating cyberspace to their advantages, and the study’s
research question suggested that terrorist groups are likewise capable of carrying out a
large-scale cyberterrorism attack against the United States. Terrorist groups have long
desired to gain capabilities in cyberspace which they continue to successfully pursue, yet
most participants believed that terrorists currently do not possess the capability to
conduct a large-scale cyberterrorism attack against the United States without state
assistance. Given this, the discussion of a pending large-scale cyberterrorism attack is
incomplete at present without the inclusion of states.
Participant J6 stated that terrorists are not yet able to produce kinetic-like effects
through the cyber realm. Likewise, participant P9 felt that terrorist groups would need to
hire out the capability to have a sustained effect over time in cyberspace since they lack
the sophistication to do it on their own. Participant C4 stated that, “the organic capability
is generally limited for international terror groups. They're digitally okay and not dumb,
so they can serve as proxies for some of the major players: Russia, North Korea, China,
and Iran among others.” He also noted that they can still do damage with a radicalized
insider.
Further, participants E1 and C4 felt that terrorists would need assistance from
states to have any chance of successfully conducting a large-scale cyberterrorism attack
against the United States, though there is no evidence that states are currently augmenting
the cyber capabilities of terrorist organizations. Participant P3 highlighted that even the
NotPetya attacks against Ukraine conducted by a state (Russia) were only effective for a
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few days, so it is unlikely that an even more sophisticated attack could be conducted by a
non-state actor against any country with respectable cyber defenses.
However, participant B2 argued that terrorists could actually possess the
capabilities to conduct an unassisted large-scale cyberterrorism attack against the United
States since only a few smart people are needed to create a cyberattack mechanism. Yet,
he did note that terrorist organizations do not need capability organic to their organization
which “leaves the door open for a lot of potential mischief by terrorist organizations,
whether they build their own capability, or they borrow it, or buy it from somebody else.”
Theme 2: Large-Scale Cyberterrorism Attack Probability
Predictably, the six participants who felt that terrorist organizations lack the
ability to unilaterally conduct large-scale cyberterrorism attacks also believed that such
an attack against the United States is low. The exception is participant B2 who felt that
the United States will fall victim to a successful large-scale cyberterrorism attack within
the next few years. However, most participants still acknowledged that smaller scale
cyberattacks are being conducted against the United States on a regular basis. The first
category in this theme addresses the low probability of a large-scale cyberterrorism attack
against the United States while the second category focuses on problematic cyber
activities currently being conducted against the country.
Low Probability
Participant E1 was skeptical about the threat of a major cyberterrorism attack that
might kill scores of U.S. citizens and instead views cyber as exclusively a state threat.
Participant C4 also felt that a major cyberterrorism attack is unlikely and not nearly as
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realistic as “a death by a thousand cuts” which relates to the second category in this
theme, activity below war threshold.
Activity Below War Threshold
Participant T5 stated that the United States is being attacked right now, but not to
the level of 9/11, and from adversaries who are either attempting to cause disruption or
are probing the U.S. cyber network. Similarly, participant E1 believed that terrorist
organizations are intensely probing the United States in a multitude of ways, including
testing the country’s critical infrastructure, while participant A7 felt that terrorists prefer
to gather information through cyber means from vulnerable businesses to use for
intimidation purposes. Lastly, participant C4 reiterated that most digitally connected
organizations throughout the world who could help terrorist organizations would rather
practice cyber espionage with the goal of having no reaction from the countries being
probed. Because of this, he felt that aggressive offensive cyber actions against the United
States are unlikely.
Participant B2 clarified that while cyber espionage needs to be addressed, it is not
cyberterrorism but simply an extension of “old-fashioned spying” which is not illegal in
international law. Yet, participant T8 is concerned that organizations have been
conducting intelligence preparation of the environment with the intention of folding
cyber into any future conflicts. Similarly, participant P9 explained that the United States
is concerned with attacks generated from weaponizing capabilities gained from cyber
espionage since these types of threats, such as national election interference, have the
potential to undermine the very basis for democracy. However, participant E1 argued that
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the United States still does not know exactly how to respond to harmful attacks against
the country that utilize only “zeros and ones.” Participant C4 lastly felt that organizations
can destabilize a country with ease if they conduct cyber operations just below the
threshold of warfare since those operations do not galvanize citizens or gain the attention
of policymakers.
Theme 3: Large-Scale Cyberterrorism Attack Likely Responses
Most participants felt that the United States will conduct a forceful and kinetic
response to a successful large-scale cyberterrorism attack since the effects of both a
large-scale cyberattack and a large-scale conventional attack would be similar. However,
most participants also acknowledged that attribution must first be levied in a timely
manner which is predictably much more difficult in the cyber realm. Given this, the first
category in this theme is attribution considerations.
Attribution Considerations
Participants E1, J6, and T8 argued that the United States possesses the forensic
abilities to very accurately attribute cyberattacks, and participants B2 and P9 felt that
U.S. cyber attribution is improving but acknowledged that it still takes too long to lay
blame. Participant J6 clarified that the U.S. government is often reluctant to revel
attribution sources since he likened this action to “blowing a human asset conducting a
covert operation.” Participant B2 further clarified that it is easy for countries to disguise
attacks, such as Russia routing cyberattacks through China, which could hinder the
attribution process. Lastly, participant P3 explained that most private companies are
actually not concerned with attribution since their focus is on stopping the cyberattack,
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minimizing the event, and preventing future vulnerabilities. He clarified that private
companies cannot conduct offensive cyber operations, so they are not concerned with
identifying their attackers which minimizes offensive private sector cyber innovation.
The second category in this theme is lethal response.
Lethal Response
Despite attribution difficulties, most participants agreed that the United States
would respond quickly, aggressively, and lethally in response to any successful largescale cyberterrorism attack. Participants E1 and P9 argued that the United States would
leverage all powers of government following a successful attack, including using the full
weight of the military. Further, participant T8 believed that a response would be “lethal
for the offending country,” participant C4 felt that the United States would respond
“forcibly and kinetically,” and participant J6 similarly believed the country would
respond with “overwhelming forces.” Finally, participant B2 stated that the United States
will use any means to go after everyone responsible for the successful cyberterrorism
attack and would not minimize the response in an attempt to match a cyberattack with a
cyber-response.
Theme 4: Cyberterrorism Prevention Measures
All participants agreed that the United States must do a better job aligning
different aspects of government to prevent large-scale cyberattacks, to include
cyberterrorism attacks. Additionally, most participants agreed that the United States must
drastically improve large-scale cyberattack preparations, while some participants
highlighted that having a public cyber deterrence policy would help thwart cyberattacks
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before they begin. The two categories in this theme, collective coordination and
preparation, are the second and third largest categories in this study but make up the
most cumulative codes of all themes.
Collective Coordination
Most participants agreed that the United States does not defend as a nation in
cyberspace. Participants P3 and J6 stated that the country continues to rely on companies
to defend themselves against cyberattacks. For example, participant J6 explained that,
“you would never expect Target or Walmart to defend against Russian Bear bombers”
since “it’s the job of the U.S. government to buy surface-to-air missiles.” And yet “in
cyberspace, not only Target and Walmart, but every little mom-and-pop shop must
individually defend for themselves.” Because of this, participant E1 argued that every
city, state, and locality must currently take charge of its own cyber defenses.
Participant P3 explained that cyber coordination varies amongst government
organizations, though every organization wants a role including the National Security
Agency, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Agency. Yet, the general lack of coordination amongst all government organizations
poses a risk. Participants C4 and J6 agreed that the National Security Agency has the
most cybersecurity expertise within the U.S. government, but other government
organizations are slowed by “relentless and grinding bureaucracy.” Participant C4
highlighted that his job is focused on weaving U.S. organizations together into a
collective cyber defense. Through this, he noted that every private and public
organization have their own self-interests and therefore push their own agendas which
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range from innovative to entrenched and archaic thinking. Participant P9 saw the most
cyber innovation in economic and national security organizations, though he believed the
expertise drops off drastically within manufacturing and energy based organizations. He
also noted that organizations all speak their own languages and do not fully understand
each other. Finally, participant T5 believed that coordination between different
government agencies is slowly happening but felt there is still a lot that must be done
before organizations could be considered integrated.
Participant C4 argued that the United States needs to bridge the public-private
divide and shift thinking from the multitude of ad hoc efforts to supporting a national
cyber strategy backed by strong leadership. However, participant J6 cautioned that the
country might not yet be ready to think in collective cyber defense terms. For example,
participant P9 explained that Cyber Command is developing and expanding its own
capabilities, clandestine organizations such as the Central Intelligence Agency and
elements of Joint Special Operations Command continue to run their own operations in
seclusion, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation largely works on their own with the
help of National Security Agency operators. Participant J6 highlighted that this
channelized mindset often causes overlap in cyberspace which has been a hindrance to
the successful coordination of cyber operations. Finally, participant E1 stated that the
growth of Cyber Command is a positive step for the Department of Defense, but he
explained that there is no comparable organization for the broader U.S. infrastructure
since the Department of Homeland Security does not have the authority over civilian
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federal government systems in the same way that Cyber Command does over the
Department of Defense.
Most participants felt that the U.S. government must do more to improve
collective cyber measures. Participants B2, J6, and P9 argued that the government should
limit compartmentalized information and share cyber intelligence with the private sector
in real time. Yet, participant B2 felt that the government is plagued with a culture of
secrecy which hinders private sector cooperation. For example, he stated that the
government, for the most part, gathers information from the private sector, classifies it,
and then does not share any results. He explained that because of this, some of the best
cybersecurity experts in the world do not want to deal with the U.S. government since
they view the government as an illegitimate partner.
Nevertheless, participant P9 felt that the government must be more directive with
at least some parts of the private sector in terms of what cyber security they adapt. He
acknowledged that the government has attempted to get the private sector to do more,
though only through voluntary initiatives since, as participant C4 explained, the
government legally cannot do much to force cyber protection on private companies.
Participants P3 and C4 therefore stated that private companies are largely fighting
individually and are on their own. Participant C4 believed that companies with strong
resources understand the cyber risk and are generally trying to defend themselves against
cyberattacks. For example, he explained that the financial sector recognizes the problem.
“They can hire and fire cyber people. They can fund salaries that are super competitive.
And they've therefore built some of the best security on the planet.” However, participant
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P9 explained that cyber protection tapers off in other government sectors for reasons
including limited cyber resources and outdated infrastructure such as old railroad
technology.
Preparation
Most participants agreed that the United States can improve large-scale
cyberterrorism attack preparations through an overarching strategy and a set policy.
Participant P9 felt that the United States should advertise a cyber strategy to ensure that
adversaries are aware of potential U.S. responses to any actions, while participant E1
believed that the United States would not be able to respond as effectively to any
cyberattack without a set policy. Participants C4 and T8 were generally not satisfied with
U.S. preparations for a large-scale terrorism attack, and participant P3 felt that the United
States is only prepared well for things that easily transition into mitigating circumstances
and is unprepared for cyberterrorism attacks that are not clearly understood and might
also take longer to develop. However, he acknowledged that there are venues that exist to
bring together federal, state, and military cyber groups to discuss cyberattack
preparations.
Participants E1 and B2 felt that U.S. government cyber efforts should focus more
on the defensive side, and participant T5 also believed the government should expand
cyber measures to improve pre-attack intelligence. Lastly, participant B2 explained that
almost everything industrial operates on computers which means that all systems are all
vulnerable, including air gapped systems not directly connected to the internet. Because
of this, participant T8 felt that improving software would help limit these vulnerabilities

90
while participant P9 argued the United States needs to do a better job hardening potential
cyber targets that the country is most dependent on.
Finally, most participants agreed that the United States is not prepared to deter in
cyberspace. The reasons include hesitation, unwillingness to expose classified
information, attribution uncertainty, a lack of preparation, and general unfamiliarity with
cyberspace operations. These participants also felt that the United States cultivates a
more dangerous future every time the country does not respond publicly to known
cyberattacks.
Participant J6 believed that the United States has allowed too much to go on in the
cyber realm without responding. He used the Sony Pictures Entertainment cyberattack by
North Korean hackers as an example and explained that the United States would respond
if North Korean soldiers physically attacked Sony Pictures and started destroying
computers. Yet, there was no public U.S. retaliation for the physical damage caused by
the North Koreans using cyber means within the United States. Participant J6 further
stated that the United States has never announced how the country would retaliate from a
large-scale cyberattack which raises the risk that an adversary might wrongly assume
they can get away with something that would subsequently force the United States to act.
Theme 5: Cyberterrorism Policy Agendas
Many experts cannot independently create change and must rely on decisionmakers to action their ideas. All participants in this study have national security
experience and have therefore all interacted with leaders and lawmakers at some level to
facilitate change. Cyberspace is a new and constantly evolving dimension that only the
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most technical savvy individuals completely understand. Yet, incorporating technical
heavy cyberterrorism related information into senior decision-makers’ already
constrained agendas poses a challenge for cyber and terrorism experts which is
highlighted in this theme. Policymaker problems and suggested cyber related
improvements are relayed in the theme’s three categories: technical knowledge,
policymaker consciousness, and agenda change factors. These categories contain
approximately one-third of the study’s codes reflecting the importance given to cyber
policy agendas by the study’s participants.
Technical Knowledge
All participants felt that there is not enough cyber understanding on the part of
decision-makers. Participant E1 pointed out that may individuals holding high-level
government positions have no experience with intelligence issues, so even explaining the
differences between the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency,
for example, would be required before progressing to the more technical aspects of
cyberspace. Participant C4 similarly felt that cyber policy construction is difficult if
policymakers do not understand the technical aspects. Participant A7 took this idea a step
further and stated that decision-makers generally have trouble even parsing out the
conception of cyberterrorism itself. She felt the challenge is for senior leaders to
conceptualize topics consisting of complicated technology with enough nuance and
understanding. For example, decision-makers should be able to navigate cyberthreats of
completely different types, problems, capabilities, and actors. However, participant P9
believed there is some misunderstanding that cyber policy is more technical than it is in
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reality. Lastly, participant C4 explained that part of the reason that there are a shortage of
decision-makers with technical knowledge is because technologically inclined individuals
prefer to stay away from policymaking, so it is also incumbent for these individuals to
learn policymaking just as it is for policymakers to become familiar with cyber’s
technical aspects.
Policymaker Consciousness
This category highlights decision-maker improvements related to cyber policy as
witnessed by participants, as well as discussing what generally garners the most attention
amongst decision-makers in each participant’s respective field. Participant P9 stated that
decision-makers are afraid of cyber to some extent. He explained that, “you don’t have to
be a coder to understand the policy implications of cyber issues just as you don't have to
be a nuclear scientist to understand nuclear policy implications.” He felt that while people
are still hesitant to get involved in cyber topics, involvement has been improving through
long term learning and education. Participant P9 also saw a parallel from the private
sector in that the appreciation of cybersecurity issues amongst CEOs has also been slowly
improving. However, he noted that cyber concerns are very uneven among industries and
sectors and felt that there is still a long way to go before cybersecurity is seen as a core
issue of national security and diplomacy. Participant E1 felt that cybersecurity will not be
seen as a core issue until the topic is raised sufficiently by a U.S. president which he
believed has yet to happen.
While there was agreement amongst all participants that decision-makers must
devote more attention to cybersecurity issues, there was no agreement on what primarily

93
drives decision-makers. The study’s participants have been exposed to similar areas and
similar levels of the U.S. government, yet this category demonstrates that policymakers
have varying motivations which makes it difficult to adapt one cyber strategy to trigger
policymaker interest.
Participant T5 believed that public opinion mainly drives policymakers, while
participants B2 and C4 felt that both the press and individuals in inner circles have the
most influence on policymakers. Participant B2 also stated that loss of life, loss of
capital, or loss in infrastructure will always get policymakers’ attention, and participant
C4 similarity felt that a response to an attack will always take priority. Participant P3
believed policymakers tend to focus on money and perception issues since they do not
want to lose money or be perceived badly. Similarly, participant P9 also felt that
perception and focusing on any major threats mostly consume policymakers. Participants
B3 and J6 stated that immediacy, or the biggest threat of the day, always captures
policymakers’ attentions, while participant A7 argued that problems are the main drivers
for policymakers. Lastly, participant T5 believed that information received through
intelligence often has the potential to become the primary focus of policymakers.
Agenda Change Factors
In this category, participants discussed what would cause cyber policy, to include
cyberterrorism policy, to align with mainstream U.S. government agendas. Participant C4
felt that the government contains many well-intentioned and smart people concerned with
the country’s cybersecurity, yet something severe would need to happen through
cyberspace in order to get leadership focused on the issue. Participants B2 and A7 stated
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that big negative events would need to occur to capture the attention of decision-makers,
though participant B2 was hopeful that cyber professionals are continuing to work hard
behind the scenes to move agendas as much as they can in absence of upper-level
decision-maker support.
Participant J6 worried that moving the cyber agenda will take a mass causality
event or another major crippling event. He explained his logic using the NotPetya attack
released by the Russians that caused over 10 billion USD worth of damage worldwide,
including hundreds of millions of dollars in the United States, yet caused no large public
reactions within the U.S. government. Lastly, participant P9 believed that continued and
effective cyberattacks against the United States would at least get policymakers to rethink
the country’s current stance on cyber activities, while participant T5 hoped that
policymakers are growing more concerned with how cyber actions are aiding countries in
their worldwide goals that are not in line with U.S. policy, such as the Russian annexation
of Crimea.
Theme 6: International Cyberterrorism Considerations
No international law directly addresses cyberterrorism, and it is also not clear how
the Geneva Conventions and the greater laws of armed conflict apply to cyberterrorism
(Baram & Menashri, 2019; Fidler, 2016; Marsili, 2019). There are additionally no U.S. or
international laws directly related to self-defense in cyberspace (Cook, 2018). Given
these considerations, the first category in this theme, international law validity, addresses
to what level the United States should consider international law when drafting cyber
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plans, to include cyberterrorism plans; while the second category, international law
integration, gauges the likelihood for agreed upon worldwide cyber regulations.
International Law Validity
Most participants agreed that the United States must acknowledge international
law when drafting cyber related deterrence and response plans regardless of how difficult
or inconvenient the task. Participant P9 stated that the United States should articulate how
international law applies in cyberspace just like in every other area. He further stated that
the United States should strive to be champions of the rule of law in all aspects and noted
that violating international law in cyberspace would hurt the country’s international
status. Participant P9 also felt that advertising strong cyber deterrence and response
initiatives that follow international law would encourage other countries to do the same
and would also serve as a point of emphasis for countries that choose not to follow
international law in cyberspace. He lastly pointed out that there are over 40 countries
developing offensive cyber capabilities which is why global cyber discussions on cyber
norms related to international law are so important, though he did not feel that
international law needs to be rewritten for cyberspace.
Participant T5 stated that cyber is global in the sense that any malware released,
for example, will spread worldwide regardless of its targeted audience. Given that, he felt
that the United States needs to consider international law because any cyber response
against one country could have unintended consequences in other countries. Participant
P3 highlighted this sentiment by explaining how Russia ceased cyberattacks against
Georgia in 2008 after Georgia moved their backup servers to a cloud-based website in the
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United States that Russia was not willing to attack. Given that, he felt that international
law applies when searching through the networks of other countries to identify
weaknesses for future attacks or to even stop an ongoing large-scale cyberattack.
Participant J6 explained that cyber is another domain of warfare, and there are
standard rules of warfare that the United States has agreed to that also generally translate
to the cyber realm. He therefore felt that cyber is not a fundamentally different domain
where the entire rules of warfare need to be rewritten. Participant C4 suggested that the
country should even consider international law throughout all cyber related preplans,
missions, and activities, while participant E1 acknowledged that cyber is still a
developing area but the United States must at least pay attention to and understand how
international law relates. Finally, participant B2 argued that international law related to
cyberspace is not that helpful but felt that the United States must still consider it in order
to demonstrate a willingness to cooperate.
International Law Integration
While most participants agreed that international law applies in cyberspace, they
were not optimistic that cyberspace rules or norms will ever be agreed upon in the current
international environment. Participant A7 felt that there will never be a cyber treaty
between the major world powers given the fundamental disconnects in worldviews.
Participant J6 also did not believe there will be a major international-level agreement on
cyber issues due to the fundamental divisions between the Western view of the cyber
domain and the Russian and Chinese views. For example, participants P3 and J6 stated
that China wants cyber treaties that allow them to have power and leverage over their
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own people and anyone else that they have influence over, and likewise with Russia who
sees cyber agreements as a way of ensuring people stay out of their way.
Participant P9 explained that these differences drive huge divisions in
intergovernmental forms such as in the UN where major disagreements are seen between
Russia and China and Western democracies coupled with Japan, Australia, and others.
Participant T8 acknowledged the international cyber divide but pointed out that the
United States has also voted down proposals regarding cyber laws and legislation in the
UN which participant E1 felt puts the country in an awkward position when it comes to
aspects of international law and cyber.
Lastly, participant P9 suggested taking cyber “out of this kind of boutique bubble
it is in” and looking at the overall relationship with other countries. To back up this
argument, he articulated that one of the reasons China agreed to an intellectual property
agreement with the United States in 2015 was because President Obama did not
categorize the issue as a cyber issue but instead categorized it as a core economic and
national security issue. President Obama was thus willing to have friction over U.S.China relations as a whole in order to resolve a cyber matter.
Summary
The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore the perceptions of U.S.
terrorism and cybersecurity experts with demonstrated federal government experience to
understand how the country might better prevent and respond to a successful large-scale
cyberterrorism attack. Data were generated through one-on-one semistructured telephone
interviews and were coded and categorized into themes in order to draw conclusions. The
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findings successfully answered the study’s research question: How do terrorism and
cybersecurity experts perceive that the United States might better prevent, cope with, and
respond to large-scale cyberterrorism attacks?
An answer would be incomplete without first conceptualizing the abilities of
terrorists to carry out large-scale cyberterrorism attacks which was articulated in Theme
1. Here, most participants agreed that terrorist cyber capabilities were weak, and the
probability of a large-scale cyberterrorism attack was therefore low which was expressed
in Theme 2. Theme 3 presented a consensus that the United States would respond
quickly, aggressively, and lethally in the event terrorists were able to carry out a
successful large-scale terrorism attack. Yet, participants unanimously agreed in Theme 4
that the United States could do much more to prevent destructive cyberattacks, including
cyberterrorism attacks, against the country which focused on working together as a nation
to form a collective cyber defense front.
However, any U.S. cyberterrorism prevention and response guidelines would
require policymaker backing and coordination which was the focus of this study’s theory.
Punctuated equilibrium theory was designed to be broadly applied to a range of
policymaking initiatives during protracted periods of stability coupled with bouts of
immediate change. The theory was thus relevant to this study given that U.S.
policymakers are responsible for selecting improved cyberterrorism defense and response
policies.
Participants highlighted the lack of technical knowledge amongst policymakers
and discussed ways to overcome policymaker cyber shortcomings in Theme 5, though
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most participants worried that cyber considerations would only be thrust into mainstream
national policy discourse following a successful large-scale cyberterrorism attack. The
internet, cyber, and most terrorist elements are global by definition, so Theme 6
categorized to what level the United States should consider international law when
preparing for or responding to a large-scale cyberterrorism attack. Most participants
agreed that international law must be considered regardless of how difficult or
inconvenient the task even though an internationally agreed upon cyber treaty is unlikely.
Chapter 5 presents the interpretations of the findings. It also discusses the study’s
limitations, recommendations, and implications and lastly outlines conclusions for this
study.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
In this chapter, I provide a summation of the purpose and review the key findings
of the study. I then discuss the limitations, recommendations, and implications of the
study and finally end with the conclusion. The purpose of this qualitative study was to
explore the perceptions of terrorism and cybersecurity experts in the United States to
understand how the country might prevent and respond to a large-scale cyberterrorism
attack. Through expert interviews, I addressed if additional measures were needed to
better handle aspects of any major cyberterrorism attack. This study filled a gap in
literature identified through an exhaustive literature review by presenting expert analysis
on current U.S. government cyberterrorism policy including the validity of creating U.S.
cyberterrorism specific deterrence and response guidelines.
I collected data from nine participants from August 27 to October 3, 2020 using
semistructured telephone interviews. All interview questions were aligned with the
research question by considering the study’s problem, purpose, structure, and theoretical
foundation. The six themes that emerged from data analysis were as follows:
•

Terrorists’ cyber capabilities

•

Large-scale cyberterrorism attack probability

•

Large-scale cyberterrorism attack likely responses

•

Cyberterrorism prevention measures

•

Cyberterrorism policy agendas

•

International cyberterrorism considerations
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Interpretation of the Findings
Through the findings, I successfully answered the study’s research question: How
do terrorism and cybersecurity experts perceive that the United States might better
prevent, cope with, and respond to large-scale cyberterrorism attacks? Most participants
agreed that terrorist organizations do not have the organic capability to carry out a largescale cyberterrorism attack against the United States, so the probability of a successful
large-scale cyberterrorism attack against the country is therefore low. However, most
participants also agreed that non-state actors could conduct a successful major
cyberattack against the United States with state assistance.
The literature review indicated that given these circumstances, the onus would be
on the United States to correctly attribute the cyberattack and levy retribution
accordingly. Most participants were satisfied with the United States’ ability to attribute
cyberattacks with a high degree of confidence. Participants also unanimously agreed that
the United States would respond quickly, aggressively, and lethally in response to a
successful large-scale cyberattack and would not restrict responses to the cyber realm.
Information in the literature review emphasized that the United States would
likely consider a state assisted cyberterrorism attack an act of war by the belligerent
government and would respond in accordance with international law. I therefore
concluded that the United States does not need to consider specific large-scale
cyberterrorism attack response options since terrorists likely do not possess the
capabilities to carry out an attack, and the United States would consider a state assisted
large-scale cyberterrorism attack an act of war from the offending country.
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However, participants also unanimously agreed that the United States could do
much more to prevent destructive cyberattacks, including cyberterrorism attacks, through
deterrence. Yet, any progress in U.S. cyberterrorism deterrence would require
policymaker backing and coordination in both pre- and potentially post-attack
environments. Experts must therefore observe and navigate U.S. government institutional
friction described in these environments by punctuated equilibrium theory in order to
offer improvements for cyberterrorism deterrence guidelines.
I used punctuated equilibrium theory to conceptualize expert cyberterrorism
deterrence improvements in two very different environments in this study. Most
participants highlighted the lack of technical knowledge amongst U.S. policymakers and
agreed that cyber considerations would only be integrated into mainstream national
policy discourse following a successful large-scale cyberterrorism attack against the
country. In accordance with punctuated equilibrium theory, policymakers have
demonstrated large-scale cyberattack complacency through bounded rationality and will
likely overreact in the chaotic environment following a catastrophic cyberattack which
could be problematic. However, most participants agreed that the United States would
still be cognizant of international law when responding to a highly destructive
cyberattack absent of any pre-drafted plans. I finally concluded that the United States
must significantly improve cyberterrorism attack deterrence guidelines, but the country is
not in danger of violating international law in the absence of this guidance.
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Limitations of the Study
The main limitation of this study was the potential for incomplete information due
to a limited number of participants. I identified a small pool of 89 potential participants
meeting expert criteria for this study and drew data from only nine of those participants
covering a topic that is relevant for scores of private and public organizations throughout
the United States. Furthermore, all study participants worked in various government,
security, legislation, and educational sectors so the perceptions of their knowledge could
have been skewed by their own lived experiences. Another major limitation of this study
was not knowing what controlled or classified information and guidance exists within the
many U.S. government layers for preventing and responding to cyberattacks. Lastly, it
was imperative for me to attempt to mitigate all potential biases as a new researcher to
not inadvertently damage the integrity of the study.
Recommendations
The opportunities for further research are broad. In this study, I highlighted many
areas for improvement including a lack of technical cyber education amongst U.S.
policymakers, a lack of cyberterrorism defense coordination between and amongst U.S.
public and private organizations, the reluctance of the U.S. government to distribute
cyber related intelligence, and the absence of cyberterrorism issues amongst top national
policy agendas. Each of these areas could be researched individually or as part of a
broader theme to further investigate the absence of cyberterrorism within the U.S.
national defense architecture. One major limitation for the study was not knowing what
classified information exists relating to U.S. cyberterrorism defense initiatives. Therefore,

104
a classified level cyberterrorism study could offer relevant policymakers a more complete
view of the topic. Additionally, further research could be conducted with U.S.
government support to include a broader sample of experts using both qualitative and
quantitative methods in order to gain a deeper and more exact understanding of
cyberterrorism focused issues. Lastly, this study could be rerun using similar methods in
the future to gauge the developments of U.S. national policy and policymaker attitudes
toward aspects of cyberterrorism.
Implications
The theoretical framework for this study was intended to be broadly applied to a
range of policymaking initiatives focusing on policy change driven by political
organizations during protracted periods of stability coupled with bouts of immediate
change. The findings of this study addressed the high relevance of punctuated
equilibrium theory since U.S. policymakers are the gatekeepers to improved
cyberterrorism related policies. Specifically, I highlighted the need for better collective
defense and prevention measures against large-scale cyberattacks in Theme 4. Yet, I
demonstrated the reluctance of policymakers to address these issues in the absence of a
successful large-scale cyberattack in Theme 5.
Therefore, punctuated equilibrium theory implications suggest that it would be
incumbent on cyber experts to drive awareness from within and amongst organizations
while simultaneously championing cyberterrorism policy consciousness since
policymakers are likely not intrinsically motivated to focus on the issue. Moreover, the
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overarching implications of punctuated equilibrium theory can be applied to research
focusing on all national policy agendas.
The implications for social change are vast. At a minimum, this study can
contribute to dialogue on a number of issues absent in cyberterrorism literature discourse
discussed in the results, including tracking terrorists’ cyber capabilities and improving the
collective national cyber defense for small private businesses to large government
organizations. Many advancements are required to create a unified U.S. cyber defense
front along with associated policies. Future research could therefore explore improved
cyberattack preparedness holistically or broken down into its many shortcomings
presented in Theme 4.
Theme 5 also addressed the lack of cyberterrorism knowledge amongst U.S.
policymakers, so this study can also be used to encourage greater policymaker
cyberterrorism awareness through education and through requiring the synthesis of cyber
related information from government organizations in order to make accurate
determinations. Lastly, a recommendation generated from the results of this study would
be to closely monitor terrorist organizations’ digital developments since continuous
innovation in cyberspace could eventually lead to a cyber 9/11 breakthrough, and the
United States will need to be ready with deterrence and response options when that
happens.
Conclusion
In this research study, I sought to determine if the United States needed
cyberterrorism-specific deterrence and response guidelines in order to better prepare for
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and respond to successful large-scale cyberterrorism attacks. A thorough literature review
found that the United States has not established cyberterrorism guidelines, with
information generally being nonexistent on the topic, and I wanted to figure out why. I
interviewed nine highly qualified cyber and terrorism experts to gather information and
discovered different reasons for why the United States does not have cyberterrorism
deterrence guidelines and why the country also does not have similarly specific response
guidelines.
The United States presents a very weak cyber defense posture, which most
participants in this study felt needed improvement, due primarily to policymaker
inattention but also as a result of highly individualistic cyber defense efforts amongst
virtually all U.S. organizations. Furthermore, the United States does not have
cyberterrorism specific response guidelines primarily because terrorist organizations most
likely do not have the capability to organically conduct a successful large-scale
cyberterrorism attack.
However, cyber technologies are exponentially increasing in sophistication and
proliferation which does not necessarily align with the metered and reflective progress of
the U.S. government and could thus be problematic. Every U.S. policymaker will be well
versed on cyberterrorism following a successful large-scale cyberterrorism attack, but
likely not until then. It is therefore incumbent on cyber experts nationwide to
surreptitiously improve defenses, raise awareness, and drive change until cyberspace is
intuitively comprehended by a technically astute generation at some point in the future,
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and hopefully not as the result of a destructive cyberterrorism attack within the United
States.
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Appendix A: Interview Protocol
Introduction
Before I begin the recording, I just wanted to reconfirm that you agree to the consent
form, are still willing to participate, and have no final questions.
[Audio recording starts here after consent form is confirmed]
Opening
Thank you for taking time to participate in this research study on Deterrence and
Response Improvements for a Large-Scale Cyberterrorism Attack. As you know, I am
Harrison Cunningham, a Ph.D. student at Walden University. The purpose of this study is
to explore the perceptions of terrorism and cybersecurity experts in the United States to
understand how the country might better prevent and respond to a large-scale
cyberterrorism attack. The findings of this study may help U.S. government policymakers
determine if large-scale cyberterrorism attack guidelines could be improved in order to
better prevent and respond to any major attack. This conversation is confidential, and
your identity will be protected using a code created specifically for this study.
Interview Questions
The next 18 questions are open-ended. I will ask one question at a time and then give you
as much time as you need to respond. Please be as detailed as possible with your
responses. If you are unable to answer a question, just let me know and we will move on
to the next one. There may be times when I will ask probing questions to get deeper
responses or for clarification, but I will not ask questions with the intent of attempting to
draw you to a particular answer. Let’s begin.
[Begin the interview research questions in Appendix B]
Conclusion
That concludes the questions. Thank you again for your time. The next step for me will
be to transcribe this interview and send you a copy that you can edit as you desire. Please
send any edits back to me as soon as you can after you receive the transcription. If you
have any questions, please feel free to contact me.
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Appendix B: Interview Questions
Opening Questions
1. What is your profession?
2. What is your role in your current profession?
3. How many years have you worked in your current profession?
4. How many years have your professional responsibilities been associated with
aspects of cyber or terrorism?
5. What have been the different focuses in your current area of expertise?
Research Question Focused Questions
6. What have been the biggest priorities of executives and decision-makers senior to
you?
7. What do you view as the greatest risks to U.S. national security?
8. Please explain your understanding of cyberterrorism.
9. How much common understanding regarding aspects of cyber and terrorism do
you see across organizations that have the ability to influence national
cyberterrorism policy?
10. How likely do you think it is that terrorists currently possess capabilities to
conduct a large-scale cyberattack against the United States? Please explain.
11. Describe your overall satisfaction with U.S. preparations for large-scale
cyberterrorism attacks.
12. In your opinion, what precautionary measures, if any, can the United States
implement to minimize the threat of a large-scale cyberterrorism attack?
13. To what extent should the United States consider international law when
preparing for or responding to a large-scale cyberterrorism attack?
14. How do you think the United States would respond to a successful large-scale
cyberterrorism attack with results comparable to or greater than 9/11?
Punctuated Equilibrium Focused Questions
15. What do you think influences the perceptions of national policy makers related to
your area of expertise?
16. What are the main drivers of the most important policy issues relating to your area
of expertise?
17. What positive or negative external factors have affected aligning cyberterrorism
awareness with the national security agenda? Please explain.
Closing Question
18. What additional information can you provide related to attacks against the United
States utilizing cyber or terrorism means?
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Appendix C: Second Cycle Codes

Code Name

Participants

1st Cycle Interview Questions
Codes
(times referenced)

Theme 1: Terrorists’ Cyber Capabilities
cyber competence
J6, A7
limited cyber sophistication
C4, J6, P9
hire cyber capability
B2, P9
cyberattacks not limited to nations
B2
cyberattacks primarily state
E1, P3
“serve as proxies”
C4
Theme 2: Large-Scale Cyberterrorism Attack Probability
Category 1: Low Probability
C4, J6, A7,
low probability
T8, P9
has been overblown
E1
attack is likely
B2
“skeptic about the threat”
E1
Category 2: Activity Below War Threshold
probing
E3, T5, A7
weaponizing espionage
T5, T8, P9
“reluctant to respond”
P9, E1
espionage
B2, C4
terrorism disinterest
P9, J6
“operating below brink of warfare”
C4

3
3
3
3
2
1

6, 8, 10
8, 10(2)
9(2), 10
5, 8(2)
8, 10
10

6

10(5), 14

2
2
1

8, 10
5(2)
11

3
3
2
2
2
1

10(2), 11
7, 10, 11
12, 14
8, 10
6, 8
10

Theme 3: Large-Scale Cyberterrorism Attack Likely Responses
Category 1: Attribution Considerations
attribution considerations
C4, J6
2
attribution capabilities
E1, P9
2
attribution improvements
B2, P9
2
“private providers don’t worry about P3
1
attribution”
“attribution would be swift”
T8
1
“easy to disguise stuff”
B2
1

8, 14
6, 10
14(2)
11
14
14
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Code Name
Category 2: Lethal Response
large lethal response
good physical disaster response

Participants

E1, B2, C4,
J6, T8, P9
P3

Theme 4: Cyberterrorism Prevention Measures
Category 1: Collective Coordination
strive for collective defense
P3, C4, T5, J6
better government info sharing
B2, J6, P9
bad agency coordination
C4, P9
get private sector to do more
C4, P9
individual industry preparedness
E1, P3, P9
US cyber command developments
E1, J6, P9
industry leading technology
E1, T5, J6
private sectors are on their own
P3, C4
need better government coordination C4, J6
private sector divisions
C4, P9
work with allies
T8, P9
more government involvement
J6, P9
splintered cyber defense
J6, A7
“private sector was actually willing” B2
“military taking on a more
P9
prominent role”
“give them actual tools they can
J6
use”
“moderating content online”
A7
Category 2: Preparation
set strategy and policy
hardware and software advances
no public deterrence
network vulnerabilities
threat disruptions
step up actions
defensive improvements
intelligence system solutions
overall strategic plan

E1, P3, C4,
T8, P9
B2, P3, T8, P9
B2, J6, P9
B2, P3, T5
C4, J6
T5, P9
E1, T5
T5, A7
A7, P9

1st Cycle Interview Questions
Codes
(times referenced)
7

10(2), 13, 14(3), 16

1

14

6
6
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
1
1

6, 7, 9(2), 11, 14
8, 11(3), 12(2)
9(2), 11, 16
6, 9, 11, 12
9, 12, 14
10, 11(2)
6, 12(2)
8, 9, 11
6, 9, 12
9(2), 17
12(2), 13
6, 12
11, 12
7
9

1

12

1

16

6

10(2), 11(3), 14

6
4
3
3
2
2
2
2

6, 11, 12(2), 14, 17
7, 8, 12, 13
8, 10, 14
8, 11, 12
7, 12
12(2)
12(2)
12(2)
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First
Cycle

Interview Questions
(times referenced)

Code Name

Participants

“government structures are still
administratively driven”
“we’ve really started pushing back”
“be prepared for it”
“streamline the legal authorities”
“we’ve allowed too much to go on”
“assume they can get away with it”

P3

1

7

J6
P3
C4
J6
J6

1
1
1
1
1

8
10
13
16
16

4
3
3
2

9(2), 15, 16
9, 12, 15
15, 16, 17
8, 9

3

6, 15, 16

2

15, 16

2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1

15, 16
11, 17
15(2)
15(2)
15
15
15
17
6
6

1
1
1

6
10
11

1
1

15
16

1

17

Theme 5: Cyberterrorism Policy Agendas
Category 1: Technical Knowledge
not enough understanding
E1, C4, P9
shortage of technical knowledge
E1, B2, C4
complicated technology
P3, A7, P9
cyberterrorism education
C4, A7
Category 2: Policymaker Consciousness
immediate threats influencing
P3, J6, A7
loss of life or capital attention
B2, C4
getting
perception influencing
P3, P9
making it personal influencing
C4
public opinion influencing
B2, T5
inner circle influencing
B2, C4
reelecting influencing
B2
press influencing
C4
received intelligence influencing
T5
world events influencing
T5
“didn’t really understand the issue”
P9
“uneven among industries and
P9
sectors”
“people are still afraid of cyber”
P9
“don’t pay attention for long”
C4
“not sought to make cyber a top
E1
priority”
“long-term learning education”
P9
“leaders who already have a
E1
background”
“senior leaders are less inclined to
E1
take on new ideas”
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Code Name

Participants

Category 3: Agenda Change Factors
policymaker focusing
B2, C4, T5,
J6, A7
“requires us to rethink our policies” P9
“understand what the threats are”
P9

First
Cycle

Interview Questions
(times referenced)

5

8(2), 14(2), 17

1
1

16
16

Theme 6: International Law Considerations
Category 1: International Law Validity
E1, B2, P3,
US must consider international law
C4, T5, J6, P9
cyber norms and international law
P3, P9

11

13(11)

2

9, 13

Category 2: International Law Integration
Russia and China agenda
E1, J6, T8, P9
China’s cyber stance
P3, J6, P9
two world visions are incongruous
J6, A7
“continuous instability undermining P9
all the good things”

4
3
2
1

9, 13(3)
13(3)
9, 13
7

